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In the traditional account, American courts transformed the law of waste,
radically diverging from British courts around the time of the American
Revolution. Some of the most influential theorists of American legal history
have used this account as evidence that American law is driven by economics.
Due to its adoption by influential scholars, this traditional account of waste
law has shaped not only our understanding of property law, but also how we
view the process of transforming law.
That traditional account, however, came not from a history of the doctrine,
but from an elaboration of the benefits of the modern rule in comparison with
the drawbacks of the earlier, common law rule. A full history, reaching back
to the common law doctrine has not been written until now. This Article
provides a legal history of the doctrine of waste, exploring the original common law doctrine prior to the nineteenth century transformation, and demonstrating the multiple flaws of the traditional account.
This Article demonstrates that there is little support for the traditional
story of a radical and American break motivated by land development. A full
account demonstrates that the change was not radical, but rather consistent
with centuries of British law. The shift also was not particularly American,
but rather roughly contemporaneous with and parallel to a British shift. Most
importantly, courts in both countries shifted doctrines to address a change in
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the technology of surveying and title recordation, rather than in response to
economic forces.
This new history of waste law also offers a critique of theories of the transformation of law, along with current methods in legal history that privilege
social factors and economic circumstances and largely abandon the traditional
legal history methods of tracing the evolution of doctrine. Abandoning doctrine and privileging social factors has detracted from accurately understanding both legal transformation and the role of law—and particularly property
law—in American society, suggesting that law is much more flexible and responsive to social change than it necessarily is in everyday politics.
I.
II.

III.
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RICHARD R. POWELL, 8 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 56.01 (Michael Allan Wolf ed.,
RALEIGH COLSTON MINOR & JOHN WURTS, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 381, 392
See infra Section II.A.
See infra Section III.B.4.
POWELL, supra note 1, § 56.02.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860, at 30
Id.
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1.
2000).
2.
(1910).
3.
4.
5.
6.
(1977).
7.
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Waste law punishes a tenant for changes to the estate that detrimentally impact the inheritance.1 For decades, waste law has presented a peculiar puzzle to scholars. The common law rule strictly punished changes to property; indeed the common law went so far as to
punish with treble damages tenants who increased the value of the property.2 Even more oddly, the courts forbade waiving waste liability
within a contract.3 As a result, courts would punish, again with treble
damages, tenants who made valuable improvements—despite leases
that had permitted the tenant to make precisely those improvements.4
Eventually, courts replaced the strict common law rule with a modern,
more lenient and value-driven rule.5 The puzzle of the original rule,
however, remained.
Morton Horwitz first addressed the puzzle of waste law, explaining socio-economic circumstances that he argued account for the modernization of the rule and, simultaneously, rationalized the old, strict
rule.6 In Horwitz’s account American courts broke from the English
rule and embraced a uniquely American perspective that supported
economic development and natural resource exploitation; a lack of
similar pressures for land development in England then explained the
old, strict rule.7 Other persuasive legal thinkers, including John
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8. John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 519, 533 (1996).
9. See Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist Interpretation, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 653 (2006).
10. See infra Parts II, III.
11. Previous narratives tended to ignore the boundary-making function entirely. Merrill only gives the old rule of preventing injury to the title a footnote. See Thomas W. Merrill, Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. and the Doctrine of Waste in American Property Law, 94
MARQ. L. REV. 1055, 1058 n.19 (2011). Purdy briefly mentions the rule against injury to title,
but does not discuss it further. Purdy, supra note 9, at 663–64.
12. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, §§ 381, 395.
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Sprankling8 and Jed Purdy,9 adopted this view.
One might argue that socio-economic pressures are a weak explanation for the puzzle of the strict common law rule. There is, however,
a more critical problem: the history, when examined in detail, does not
support the traditional account of transformation.
Only a long-range historical perspective provides the necessary
context to understand later doctrinal shifts—and to fully explain the
puzzle of the strict common law rule. This Article provides the first
full history of waste law, examining the common law well before the
transformation, along with the history of waste within the British
courts. Such a perspective indicates a key problem with traditional accounts of waste law. Incorrectly, the traditional transformation story
presumes that historically waste performed only one legal function:
maintaining property values.10
This Article demonstrates that waste law performed not one but
two distinct functions: property value maintenance and boundary
maintenance. By developing a history of English waste law and its
transformation—chapters that have been missing from the literature—
this Article demonstrates that in the common law waste performed
both of these distinct functions.11 Recognizing these two functions explains why the common law rule strictly forbade ameliorative waste,
often punishing it with treble damages. In ameliorative waste, the
changes to the property increase rather than decrease value.12 Punishing such changes seems illogical if one looks to waste law solely for
maintaining property values. Yet, as this Article will demonstrate, the
boundary-maintenance function explains this outcome. Common law
courts punished ameliorative waste because such changes jeopardized
the evidence of boundaries, which were designated on the land itself
by land uses rather than on paper via maps or metes and bounds as we
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13. Id. § 381.
14. Sprankling, supra note 8, at 533.
15. See Purdy, supra note 9.
16. For their part, property scholars often use waste law to engage theoretical quandaries. See Merrill, supra note 11, at 1055 (explaining that waste law “has held a peculiar fascination for property theorists”). John Lovett also has argued for the importance of waste.
John A. Lovett, Doctrines of Waste in a Landscape of Waste, 72 MO. L. REV. 1209, 1227 (2007).
Posner seems to have considered disagreeing, but acknowledged that Lovett “argues forcefully for the continued practical importance of the doctrine of waste.” Richard A. Posner,
Comment on Merrill on the Law of Waste, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1095, 1099 n.9 (2011).
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expect in modern society.13
This Article demonstrates that the modern value-focused rule,
which does not punish ameliorative waste, results from modern methods of surveying and recording titles, which displaced the need for the
physical description of the landscape to act as a boundary. Waste law
changed as a result of the professionalization and modernization of
surveying, along with innovations in title recording, which made the
boundary maintenance function obsolete. As a result, courts eliminated the boundary function and reemphasized the remaining value function, maintaining a deep fidelity to the English legal tradition. This
American doctrinal shift mirrored a contemporaneous English one.
Rather than America’s doctrine changing to take advantage of land
opening to development, both English and American doctrines shifted
in response to the professionalization and modernization of surveying.
As this Article will establish, law was responsive not to the socioeconomic pressures of land development but to the routine advances
of technology, particularly in a situation where a doctrine could be adjusted by removing one now-obsolete prong of a test and reinforcing
the existing ones.
Establishing this more accurate understanding of waste law matters beyond the bounds of property law. Like Horwitz, other persuasive legal thinkers, including John Sprankling14 and Jed Purdy,15 have
employed the traditional story of the transformation of waste law to
support larger assertions about the transformation of American law to
support economic development and, in particular, industrialization.
Waste law has regularly figured into American legal theory for the last
fifty years.16
Ultimately, this Article critiques both a particular theory of the nature of American law and its amenability to transformation and the
methodology of modern legal history—a methodology largely adopted
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due to Horwitz’s vast influence on the field.17 This Article argues that
legal historians have largely abandoned their native methodology of
tracing the evolution of doctrine in favor of law and society approaches that seek social and economic explanations for legal change. When
historians focus on social factors and economic circumstances that may
influence law without giving much attention to law’s power to resist
social change and maintain fidelity to past precedents, they not only
create less accurate historical accounts, but also skew perceptions of
the role of law in society. Privileging the social context above tracing
the evolution of legal doctrines ultimately distorts the role of law—and
particularly property law—in American society, suggesting that it was
much more flexible and responsive to socio-economic change than it
necessarily was.
The focus on law as a construct effective for achieving social, economic, and spatial goals can distort the nature of law as an independent and stable structure of society—one that much more often than not
affirms existing rights and investments, particularly where property is
concerned. Too much emphasis on social contexts, and particularly on
anachronistic future outcomes such as environmental destruction, neglects the role of law as a conservative force in society—one that
makes changes, particularly in property rights, more difficult to
achieve. The argument does not aim to displace the practice of examining the impacts of social and economic forces on law, but rather to
suggest that we have gone too far on the continuum, favoring social
explanations for legal change and ignoring consistencies maintained
through the evolution of doctrine. This Article argues for reintegrating
the distinctly legal history methodology of tracing the evolution of
doctrine and simultaneously demonstrates this corrected methodology.
Following this introduction (Part I), Part II sets forth the original
common law rule of waste. Part II then turns to the shift to the modern rule, outlining how various scholars have described the doctrinal
shift. Parts III and IV cumulatively develop a new history of waste
law. Part III focuses on waste law prior to the doctrinal shift, detailing
the previously undescribed boundary maintenance function. Part III
elaborates the process of marking boundaries through land uses and
the role of waste law in preventing changes that would muddy those

06/19/2017 09:53:44

17. See infra Section II.B.1.
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land use boundaries. Part IV then provides a new account of the transformation, both in British law and in American law. Part IV draws on
the history provided in Part III to explain how changes in technology
provided new methods of maintaining boundaries much more effectively than was possible by simply using waste law to maintain existing land uses. In its final section, Part IV summarizes the merits of this
new account of the transformation of waste law and details how it
provides a more accurate understanding of waste law when compared
with the traditional accounts. Part V addresses the timing of the
shift—explaining how the new history of waste law answers the chronology question. Finally, Part VI uses the new history to develop a critique of current theory and methods in legal history, focusing on why
so many similar accounts of waste law existed, but none of those accounts engaged the doctrine within its historical context prior to the
doctrine shift. This Part then develops a prescription for modern legal
historians to correct recent tendencies that may skew our understanding of legal transformation and the role of law in society.
II. THE COMMON LAW RULE AND TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS OF THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WASTE LAW
A. The Common Law Rule of Waste

C M
Y K

06/19/2017 09:53:44

18. For the sake of simplicity, I will use the terms “reversioner” and “plaintiff” synonymously for the party who will next take possession of the property and who would be alleging waste. I will use the terms “tenant” or “defendant” synonymously for the party who
currently has rights to occupy the property and who may be held liable for waste. Because
the technical differences have no bearing on the argument made, I have simplified the terminology.
19. POWELL, supra note 1, § 56.01.
20. For further discussions of how both the parties liable for waste and the parties situated to bring an action for waste have changed, see MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, §§ 390–
93 (describing, separately, who is “punishable for waste” and who is “entitled to complain
of waste”). Initially, formal procedures limited the parties able to receive relief. POWELL,
supra note 1, § 56.02. Bewes finds that in the oldest formulation, only three parties were liable for waste, because they were liable via the operation of law, rather than “by contract or
quasi contract”: “tenants in dower and by the curtesy, and guardians in chivalry.”
WYNDHAM ANSTIS BEWES, THE LAW OF WASTE 1 (1894). But not all scholars agree on the
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It is appropriate to begin with the strict common law rule of waste.
A cause of action for waste allows a reversioner18 to recover against a
tenant for changes to the estate that detrimentally impact the inheritance.19 Waste arises in a variety of contexts, including life estates, reversions, leases, and dower property. 20 The common law has long pro-
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tected the reversioner’s interests. The Statute of Marlebridge (Marlborough) (1267) provided that “[a]lso fermors,21 during their terms,
shall not make waste, sale nor exile of house, woods, and men, nor of
anything belonging to the tenements that they have to ferm.”22
Waste may be either permissive or voluntary.23 Permissive waste
arises not through malicious actions, but instead through some omission.24 A tenant might notice a weak support for the porch roof, but
rather than reinforcing the support, ignores the problem.25 The tenant’s omission ultimately results in the collapse of the roof, creating li-

06/19/2017 09:53:44
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precise evolution of liabilities and standing; see George W. Kirchwey, Liability for Waste, 8
COLUM. L. REV. 425, 425–26, 437 (1908) (discussing the shifting liabilities of parties over
time).
21. Some commentators have translated the term “fermors” as a misspelling of “farmers.” See Purdy, supra note 9, at 662. This is not historically accurate. Fermors held a specific meaning in the common law, which was not synonymous with the general term for agricultural occupations. “The term ‘fermors’ comprehends all who hold by lease for life or
lives or for years, by deed or without deed.” JOSEPH HAWORTH REDMAN, THE LAW OF
LANDLORD AND TENANT 256 (5th ed. 1901) (citing 2 COKE’S INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF
ENGLAND 145 (1642)).
22. POWELL, supra note 1, § 56.02.
23. Many modern writers divide waste into three categories, voluntary, permissive,
and ameliorating. E.g., Merrill, supra note 11, at 1057. There is a certain oddity to this
alignment, because the only difference between voluntary and ameliorating waste is that
the value of the property increases. This means that creating a third category destroys the
neat alignment of a division otherwise based on the type of conduct by the tenant (act or
omission). Additionally, at first glance it suggests that ameliorating waste would not be
voluntary, and yet one struggles to imagine a scenario in which it is not. The three categories are a modern trend, and one that, for the reasons stated, may not best organize our
thoughts on the subject. Here, I have preferred following the historic trend of treatise writers who divided waste only into voluntary and permissive, treating amelioration as a subspecies. See ARTHUR W. BLAKEMORE, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 323 (1917) (describing two
types of waste, permissive and voluntary); 1 CHARLES T. BOONE, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
300 (1901) (categorizing two types of waste, permissive and voluntary); MINOR & WURTS,
supra note 2, §§ 380–81 (categorizing waste as either voluntary or permissive, and later discussing amelioration within those structures); GEORGE V. YOOL, AN ESSAY ON WASTE,
NUISANCE, AND TRESPASS 3 (1863) (describing ameliorating waste, then concluding that all
waste is “either voluntary or permissive”).
24. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, §§ 380–81, 386.
25. In its strictest formulation at the common law, this went so far as to include liability for a house burning down by “mischance,” which suggests that liability occurs even if
the tenant was not negligent. YOOL, supra note 23, at 56. Although it seems to require some
act, if accidental, of the tenant, who must have so “misadventure[d].” 2 WILLIAM WAIT, A
TREATISE UPON SOME OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 113 (1877). This may be contrasted with acts of god or nature, such as lightning or tempests that might also burn down
a house. 3 WILLIAM DOUGLAS EDWARDS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN
LAND 68 (3d ed. 1896).
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26. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, §§ 380–81.
27. YOOL, supra note 23, at 2.
28. Id.; 1 BOONE, supra note 23, at 306. Bewes describes the courts as applying the
common law standard “with merciless severity.” BEWES, supra note 20, at 9.
29. Greene v. Cole (1669) 85 Eng. Rep. 1037 (KB) 1047.
30. Id.; YOOL, supra note 23, at 1 (citing Darcy v. Askwith (1618) 80 Eng. Rep. 380 (KB)).
31. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 380. One might argue that the ameliorative applications of waste law also protected the owner’s right to be different or idiosyncratic. While
occasionally cases do mention that the reversioner has a right to the thing that was initially
in existence, such occasional comments do not really support an idea of individual rights
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ability for permissive waste. When voluntary waste occurs, the tenant
acted to harm the property.26 The tenant might simply tear down the
porch, giving the reversioner a cause of action for voluntary waste.
Under the common law rule, whether the allegation was for permissive or voluntary waste, the rule required the reversioner to prove
some impairment of the inheritance. To establish an impairment of the
inheritance, the common law of waste required damage through at
least one of three mechanisms: “(1) [b]y diminishing the value of the
estate; (2) [b]y increasing the burthen upon it; (3) [b]y impairing the
evidence of title.”27
The common law enforced waste strictly, holding landowners responsible for virtually all changes to the landscape.28 The common law
forbade a tenant from “convert[ing] ancient meadow into arable, or arable or pasture into wood.”29 In general, the tenant “ha[d] no power to
change the nature of the thing demised.”30
Voluntary waste contained an important subcategory, ameliorative
waste, which is key to understanding the shift to modern waste law.
With ameliorative waste, there is a fundamental change in the nature
of the property—something forbidden under the strict rule—but that
change increases the value. Suppose the property contains a home in a
somewhat industrialized area of town and the tenant tears down the
home to build a storefront. While the land with the home was valued
at $60,000, the land with the storefront is valued at $120,000. In such
circumstances, the tenant committed ameliorative waste. The tenant
has violated the technical requirement not to change the nature of the
inheritance, but the tenant has economically advantaged rather than
damaged the reversioner. The common law rule was known for its
strict enforcement of the ancient law, forbidding all changes to the
property, even when those changes would economically benefit the
reversioner.31
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Remedies for waste included both injunctions and damages
awards. Courts rarely bothered with nominal damages,32 but otherwise enforced waste law stringently, using treble damage awards,33 as
well as injunctions to prevent changes to land that might destroy evidence of the title.34 If damages had been the sole remedy, tenants
might have pursued ameliorative waste and made changes to the
property for the purposes of economic development, but both treble
damage awards and injunctions prevented such choices.
The strict common law rule initially found root in America, but
eventually American courts adopted a new approach to waste. A
number of historians and property theorists have examined the adoption of the new rule and used this transformation to support broader
assertions about the nature and malleability of law.
B. Traditional Accounts of the Transformation of Waste Law
1. Horwitz on the Shift to the New Rule
Morton J. Horwitz, expanding on James Willard Hurst’s approach
of incorporating social context into analyses of legal change,35 produced one of the foundational accounts of legal history using a socioeconomic lens. He set out to prove that “[b]y 1820 the legal landscape
in America bore only the faintest resemblance to what had existed forty years earlier.”36 Horwitz created a narrative of the transformation
of waste law in the United States, using this narrative as evidence of
the developing distance between English and American law.37 Ameri-

06/19/2017 09:53:44
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very effectively because so many of the cases of waste involve not a property that will return to the same person, but a property that will be held by one person before being passed
on to another. In other words, much of the time we are protecting John’s right to receive the
falling-down barn that his uncle gifted to him (after a life estate), not John’s right to receive
back his falling-down barn.
32. BEWES, supra note 20, at 130.
33. See id. at 9 (discussing the “merciless” application of the rule, including treble
damages, in cases of ameliorative waste).
34. 1 WILLIAM CRUISE, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL
PROPERTY 67 (1804).
35. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW (1950); JAMES WILLARD
HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED
STATES (1956). Scholars generally credit Hurst with leading American legal historians away
from a strict examination of legal reasoning to a more robust account of legal developments,
incorporating the social and economic contexts of those changes.
36. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 30.
37. Id. at 55, 59.
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Id.
Id. at 54.
Id. at 58.
1 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND OTHER
INTERESTS IN LAND 951 (2d ed. 1920).
42. Liability for Ameliorative Waste, 43 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1131 (1930).
43. Id.
44. Lovett, supra note 16, at 1227.
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can courts, he argued, had transformed English law rapidly and drastically.38
More importantly, Horwitz identified the particular forces behind
that transformation as economic. “[A]n economy dependent on clearing land for economic development,” he argued, “could not enforce a
rule of maintaining the existing condition of land. From the moment
of independence from England, therefore, American jurists devoted
their efforts to modifying or overturning the received common law
doctrine.”39 Horwitz concluded that “the premise that underlay the
changing law of waste was that it was preferable to encourage immediate improvement by tenants.”40
Horwitz’s argument regarding waste law was not entirely novel.
Other, more skeletal accounts of the transformation of waste already
had followed Hurst’s example and looked to social forces for sources
of legal change. For example, the 1920 edition of Tiffany’s Real Property’s described “[t]he general tendency of American courts” as “restrict[ing] the application of the English law of waste, in order to adapt
it to the conditions of a new and growing country, and to stimulate the
development of the land by the tenant in possession.”41 In 1930 a Harvard Law Review article by an unnamed author briefly stated that the
change in doctrines in England was spurred by “the rise of the industrial movement of the early nineteenth century.”42 The author concluded that American courts followed suit “in an effort to encourage
the rapid development of property.”43
For Horwitz, the story of waste law simply demonstrated “the
transition from an eighteenth century understanding of private law as
fixed doctrine to one in which private law adjudication became a creative instrument for promoting social change and economic growth.”44
More specifically, he saw the changes in waste law as a part of a larger
project of commodifying land and “freeing land from both social controls and inconvenient existing claims, held by smallholders, in order
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to make it available as a capital-generating resource for the economic
development of the continent.”45 For Horwitz, the story of waste law
formed a contributing narrative to the overall story of how Americans
reshaped the common law to support burgeoning economic development, both industrialization and the project of claiming and taming the
land.
2. Sprankling on the Shift to the New Rule

Purdy, supra note 9, at 661.
Sprankling, supra note 8, at 533.
Id. at 521.
Id. at 519.
Id. at 521.
Id.
Id. at 522.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 523.
Id. at 524–25.
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Like Horwitz, Sprankling utilized the transformation of waste law
as evidence of a much larger trend in American law.46 Horwitz’s narrative, along with Hurst’s influence more generally, shaped Sprankling’s environmental approach to understanding the transformation
of waste law.47 Sprankling focused on the role of law in the destruction of wilderness land.48 Sprankling argued that law developed a
substantial bias towards development.49 This bias, he argued, was not
accidental, but rather the product of “judges retool[ing] English property law doctrines to meet the conditions in the new United States.”50
When Sprankling spoke of meeting the new conditions, he did not
mean that law simply flexed to meet new scenarios, but rather that
judges specifically reworked the common law to “further economic
development.”51
The transformation of waste law formed the very heart of his evidence; it was, by his estimation, “the most obvious example of antiwilderness retooling.”52 Sprankling cast the strict, common law rule as
a force for conservation. English property law, if adopted wholesale,
“was a poor tool for encouraging the exploitation of virgin land.”53
When examining English property law, Sprankling found that the
“system focused on preserving the condition of land already in productive use in a mature agrarian economy.”54 English waste law, in
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particular, “tended to perpetuate the land-use status quo.”55 Sprankling concluded that given the landscape conditions in England, the
country’s waste law “unsurprisingly favored conservation.”56 The
English doctrine, Sprankling concludes, “would have arrested development.”57
Sprankling contrasted the common law with the modern rule,
which he saw as American courts refashioning waste to allow land
clearing.58 The American courts were, he concluded, “[d]riven by [an]
instrumentalist vision.”59 As a result, he describes the American courts
as “resoundingly jettison[ing]” the English approach to waste.60
3. Purdy on the Transformation of American Waste Law
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Id. at 534.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 534–35.
Id.
Id. at 535.
Purdy, supra note 9, at 654.
JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY 45–47 (2010).
Purdy, supra note 9, at 653.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 661.
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Purdy develops his analysis of waste law both in an article focusing on the topic exclusively61 and, briefly, in his recent book.62 Purdy
examines the transformation of waste law asking “[w]hat causes account for the development of property regimes across time.”63 He
both accepts and challenges the narratives built by Horwitz and
Sprankling. First, Purdy accepts Horwitz and Sprankling’s primary
argument that economic forces “help[] to explain the change.”64 To
this explanation, however, Purdy adds other forces, finding that “the
full story, however, emerges only upon consideration of two other influences on waste doctrine: republican political culture, and the belief
that European settlers were under a natural-law obligation to subdue
the American wilderness and make it a fruitful, agrarian landscape.”65
Purdy ultimately concludes that courts adopt the new rule “to promote efficient use of resources that the English rule would have inhibited.”66
Like both Horwitz and Sprankling, Purdy uses the transformation
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of waste law to make a larger argument about American property law.
The transformation in waste law, Purdy concludes, “is suggestive of
the plurality of values at work in American land regimes generally.” 67
When it comes to narrating the transformation, Purdy relies primarily on Jackson v. Brownson.68 He cites a dissent, which noted that
the old rule was “inapplicable to a new, unsettled country.”69 Purdy
finds that other courts followed the Jackson decision, adopting the good
husbandry approach because “American courts envisioned this flexibility in contrast to the fixity of the English rule, which they saw as potentially locking the tenant into existing land-use patterns and forbidding the mutually beneficial activity that the American standard
embraces.”70
4. Merrill on the Moment of Transformation
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67. Purdy cites both a practical, economic justification behind the new waste rule and
multiple cultural reasons (both economic and sociopolitical). Purdy argues that the new
rule has a “mixed profile.” On the one hand, it “promot[es] efficiency in contracting.” On
the other hand, “its introduction can be convincingly explained as an expression of the
then-current commitments in America to republicanism and economic dynamism.” Ultimately, Purdy uses this multiple causation approach to argue that “a default rule can have
normative as well as efficiency-enhancing functions.” Id. at 661–62.
68. Id. at 668–69.
69. Id. at 670.
70. Id. at 676.
71. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1059.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1060.
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Following the trend, Merrill used the transformation of waste law
as a way of engaging the question of the function of property in society. Merrill viewed the strict, common law rule as “consistent with the
view of property as an individual right,” and with promoting “autonomy, security, the ability to make long-term plans, [and] the right to be
different.”71 He reasoned that the new waste rule was less about individual rights and more about “the view of property as a social institution.”72 The new rule, Merrill found, was a way to manage conflict
when there were temporary transfers that are likely to cause such conflict.73 Merrill, then, saw the transformation of waste law in terms of
the continual conflict in property theory—the “fundamental question,”
as he puts it—of “whether property is an individual right or social institution.”74 He extended his interpretation of Melms v. Pabst Brewing
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75. 104 Wis. 7, 8, 79 N.W. 738, 738 (1899).
76. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1060.
77. Id. at 1080.
78. Melms, 104 Wis. at 13–15.
79. 237 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff’d mem. per curiam, 245 N.Y.S. 402 (App. Div. 1930),
aff’d mem. per curiam, 177 N.E. 186 (N.Y. 1931).
80. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1082–83.
81. Id. at 1083.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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Co.75 as a landmark case in waste law to “a bellwether for assessing our
understanding of the basic purposes of property law.”76
Merrill dismissed the explanations given by Horwitz, Purdy, and
Sprankling, arguing that “[the] transformation was not a manifestation
of inexorable social and economic change. Rather, it was a top-down
reform introduced by the Legal Realist movement.”77 Merrill described two conflicting decisions—Melms, a Wisconsin case that adopted the new rule,78 and Brokaw v. Fairchild,79 a New York case that rejected the new rule—as well as subsequent, successful lobbying after
Brokaw that persuaded the New York legislature to adopt a new statute
in line with the Melms decision.80 Merrill concluded that the Melms
rule prevailed because “[t]he New York reform proved to be highly influential with bodies such as the American Law Institute, which also
adopted a test consistent with Melms for inclusion in the Restatement of
Property.”81 Merrill concluded that the American Law Institute and the
New York Law Review Commission favored the new rule because it
“embod[ied] the view of property as a social institution.”82 Whereas
the strict, common law rule allowed the reversioner to maintain idiosyncratic views about the ideal use of his property, the new rule allowed the law to “facilitate the efforts of individuals to reach the correct answer, without regard to what particular individuals with
possibly idiosyncratic views might think.”83 For Merrill, the new rule
fostered development, because it allowed society to determine “the
highest and best use of land” rather than maintaining existing uses.84
At a more theoretical level, Merrill concluded the new rule embodied
an overall shift in American jurisprudence toward a more social concept of property.85
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III. A NEW HISTORY OF WASTE LAW: THE COMMON LAW RULE AND
LAND USE AS BOUNDARIES

A. Early Surveying
The first documents described as “maps” of kingdoms were lists
rather than pictorial representations of the territory.89 Each “map” described the various feudal leaders beneath the king, the territories
held, and their duties to the king such as the number of men providing
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86. YOOL, supra note 23, at 2.
87. See infra Section III.B.
88. See infra Section III.B.
89. See Josef W. Konvitz, The Nation-State, Paris and Cartography in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century France, 16 J. HIST. GEOGRAPHY 3, 7 (1990) (describing the origins of the concept of a map within cartography in France).
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Each of these accounts of the change assumed that waste law provided only one legal function. Understanding the true reason for the
shift, which happened not only in America but also in the very different land development context of England, requires a full history of the
doctrine, and particularly a history that looks back to the doctrine before the shift to determine its multiple purposes. This Part explains the
history of the doctrine, detailing how waste law historically protected
not only property value but also property boundaries. The first hint of
this second function is clear in the traditional formulation of the rule in
the common law. The common law required damage through at least
one of three mechanisms: “(1) By diminishing the value of the estate;
(2) By increasing the burthen upon it; (3) By impairing the evidence of
title.”86 Waste law maintained boundaries because it prevented
changes to the land that would impair the evidence of the title.87 This
rule, in and of itself, however, is not particularly clear without an understanding of the processes of surveying land prior to industrialization.
To provide this historical context, this Part describes the process of
bounding land in English law, explaining how waste law maintained
boundaries in a system that allocated land and recorded land ownership through descriptive rather than visual or physical markers,
through land use and butting and bounding rather than through precise surveying technology.88 This part begins with a brief history of
early surveying.
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90. Id.
91. Robert Sibbald, Advertisement, in the COLLECTIONS OF THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL
LIBRARY (1682).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. TRISTRAM RISDON, THE CHOROGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION, OR SURVEY OF THE
COUNTY OF DEVON (1714).
97. Id. (for example, “[t]he Glebe and Soil of Devonshire is diverse; in the Entrance, on
the East Part of the Shire, the Mould standeth most upon white Chalk, which is passing
good for Sheep and Corn; a little farther it consists of a red and blue Marle, which is no
rocky, but an earthy Substance; this Soil is most natural for pasturing of Beasts, though it be
plentifully furnish’d with Corn”).
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knight service in the event of war.90 This type of survey, which was
more a list of attributes of a region than a visual depiction of it, persisted longer than a modern reader might guess.
For example, as late as the end of the seventeenth century, a survey
of Scotland resulted in lists rather than maps. In 1682, when King
Charles II appointed Sir Robert Sibbald as Geographer Royal, Sibbald
set out to make a new survey of Scotland.91 Shortly thereafter, he
printed a large advertisement entreating the many nobles of Scotland
to send him lists of “[w]hat Seriffdomes, Baillieries, Stewartires, Regalities, Baronies, and Burrows they have under them?”92 Sibbald also
requested lists of “the Nature of the County,” “the chief products
thereof,” along with “[w]hat Plants, Animals, Mettals, Substances, cast
up by the Sea are peculiar to the place.”93 Sibbald warned his readers
of the consequences of failing to answer his advertisement.94 He explained, “The answers to these Queries is earnestly desired that no
person may complain, if what concerns them be not insert[ed].”95 Sibbald’s warning likely sought to ensure that no one later complained
that his properties and rights were omitted from the listing of the
King’s territories.
Mirroring these maps of kingdoms, through the sixteenth century
and the first half of the seventeenth century surveys and maps of estates in land were not visual depictions of streams, forests, fields, and
manor houses. Rather, the surveys listed allocated rights in descriptive, but not visual, form. For example, in 1714, Tristram Risdon published a survey of the county of Devon.96 Risdon describes the climate,
landscapes, industries, and resources of the land, along with a history
of both property and political control.97 In his extensive book, he in-
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98. Id.
99. Id.
100. RICHARD CAREW, THE SURVEY OF CORNWALL (1769).
101. Id. at 12–13.
102. See id. Notably, as of 1699, Vincent Wing finds that “very few Authors of Surveying have touched upon” the subject of “Directions for taking the Map of a County.”
VINCENT WING, A COMPLEAT BODY OF SURVEYING 242 (John Wing ed. 1699). Wing himself
devotes approximately one and a half pages to the topic. Id. at 242–43.
103. 4 WILLIAM LEYBOURN, THE COMPLEAT SURVEYOR: OR, THE WHOLE ART OF
SURVEYING OF LAND 102–03 (5th ed. 1722).
104. Id. at 102.
105. See id.
106. Id.
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cludes one drawing of a building, but no other illustrations or maps of
the landscape at all.98 Risdon focuses more on listing territorial controls, sherrifdoms, and so forth.99 Similarly, Richard Carew’s survey of
Cornwall, published in 1769, described the landscape, soil quality, and
the natural resources available within the area.100 Carew also discusses
in some detail the process by which a person may claim a particular
portion of ground on which to dig for tin and how to maintain the legal claim through bounding on an annual basis.101 Like others, Carew
draws up his survey by listing resources, crops, animals, and the legal
jurisdictions, or Hundreds, of the county, but includes no drawings or
maps to visually represent the region.102
The manor survey performed rather the same function as these
larger surveys, cataloging legal rights through lists. The manor survey
listed the various tenants, the amount of land each held, and their various rights upon the commons such as fire-bote.103 The surveyor found
“the just Quantity of every Man’s Ground, both Arable, Ley-ground
and Meadow,” and then prepared a field book to maintain a record of
the parcels.104
The surveyor kept track of this complex system. Notably, rather
than teaching geometry, early guides for surveyors taught basic property law.105 Such books included legal descriptions of different rights
on land and different types of estates in land.106 The early surveyor’s
guidebook explained the nature of a manor: “A Mannor then consists
of Lands, Wood, Meadow, Pasture and Arable, Messuages, Tenements,
Services, and Hereditaments, Whereof part are Demesnes, being such
as anciently, and ultra memoriam, the Lord has ever used, occupied
and manured with the Manor-house. The rest are either Free-holds,
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Farms, or customary or copyhold Tenements.”107 The guide would
then proceed to explain the many types of rights that citizens might
have upon these particular lands.108 The surveyor’s book would record each of the rights, noting private rights to particular parcels as well
as the many rights that the citizen might hold to the common areas of
the manor.109
Surveyors also acted much as farm managers or advisors. Tracts
celebrating the role of the surveyor portray him as educating the
farmer or landowner about how grounds can be planted, drained, or
improved to greater profit over time.110 Instruction manuals for surveyors provided extensive advice on the draining of lands through
construction of ditches and small-scale canals.111 For example, Cressey
Dymock’s A Discoverie for Division or Setting out of Land, as to the Best
Form, spends most of its pages discussing how and why fens and
marshes of England should be drained as well as how land might be
improved through the use of manures and fertilizers.112 Similarly, William Leybourn’s The Compleat Surveyor explains how to slowly drain a
bog, even when “your bog be so tender that you cannot go upon it” by
locating the springs and creating ditches to channel the water away.113
Even as the surveying profession became more technical and specialized throughout the eighteenth century, surveyors continued to advise
landowners regarding the improvement of lands.114
Early surveyors did not use specialized equipment, but instead
simply walked the landscape to create descriptive records. Rather,
measurements were fluid and approximate,115 often using agricultural
units.116 Measurements reflected the realities of farming: “a day’s
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Id. at 75.
Id. at 76.
Id.
See JOHN NORDEN, SURVEYOR’S DIALOGUE (1607); AN OLDE THRIFT NEWLY
REVIVED (1612).
111. WILLIAM EMERSON, THE ART OF SURVEYING OR MEASURING LAND 135 (1770).
112. CRESSEY DYMOCK, A DISCOVERIE FOR DIVISION OR SETTING OUT OF LAND, AS TO
THE BEST FORM (1653) (located in the Collections of the Scottish National Library).
113. 4 LEYBOURN, supra note 103, at 132.
114. For example, Emerson describes how a surveyor would determine whether to advise a landowner to consider building a canal for the purpose of draining land. EMERSON,
supra note 111, at 135.
115. Shaunnagh Dorsett, Mapping Territories, in JURISPRUDENCE OF JURISDICTION 148
(Shaun McVeigh ed., 2007).
116. By the beginning of the eighteenth century, some surveyors endeavored to edu-
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journey or a morning’s ploughing.”117 Putting allocations onto paper
meant using textual descriptions of the landscape’s uses.
Newly acquired lands were laid out by a process of perambulation,
or walking the sides of the land to estimate the acreage acquired and to
create a written description.118 To construct boundaries between parcels, surveyors utilized landscape features, a process known as butting
and bounding.119 For the very largest parcels, the surveyor might reference prominent landmarks such as creeks, ravines, bogs, ridges,
hills, and valleys.120 For smaller plots of land, the most efficient reference was one that specifically included a land use.121 Thus, a parish
might be bounded by the “common on the north,” or “Alwardby
fields” on the west.122 For example, “[t]he manor [of the Parish of
Aspatria] is of a square form, being bounded by Aspatria Common on
the north and east sides, by Baggray fields on the south, and by
Aspatria Field on the west.”123 To describe a particular plot, the surveyor would record the neighboring landscapes: “from such a place to
such a place, and so on till the starting-point was reached again.”124
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cate others about the geometry and mathematics that would provide more accurate measurements of land. See, e.g., WING, supra note 102. Notably, Wing seems to assume no
knowledge of mathematics whatsoever of his reader—beginning with the very basics of
addition, subtraction, multiplication, fractions, decimals, and so forth. Id. at 1–26. By the
end of the eighteenth century, surveying had become more professionalized and more of a
mathematical process. Thus, by 1770, William Emerson was able to describe surveying as
“measuring land,” or “the art of finding the content of any field, or parcel of land; which is
always expressed in acres and decimal parts.” EMERSON, supra note 111, at 1.
117. Dorsett, supra note 115, at 148. Indeed, surveyors were to some degree intentionally inaccurate in reflecting all of the features of a landscape: when surveyors set out to create a new division of land, the grant generally prescribed a particular number of acres. This
was presumed to refer to arable acres. Thus the surveyor would stick to a “strict Proportion
of Quantity” of arable acres. EDWARD LAURENCE, THE YOUNG SURVEYOR’S GUIDE 174
(1716). Thus, “if there . . . be an unuseful Pond, Lake or Puddle, or if there be any Boggy or
barren Ground, that must be cast out in the Division.” Id. The surveyor would “measure
that first, and subtract it from the Content of whole Close, and then lay the just Quantity of
the remainder on that side that is free from it.” Id. Thus a total of 200 acres described in the
survey would include more than 200 acres when one included the non-arable portions of
“that which is useless.” Id. at 175.
118. Dorsett, supra note 115, at 141.
119. LAURENCE, supra note 117, at 174.
120. Id.
121. 2 WILLIAM HUTCHINSON, THE HISTORY OF THE COUNTY OF CUMBERLAND 287
(1794).
122. Id. at 286–87.
123. Id. at 293.
124. FREDERIC SEEBOHM, THE ENGLISH VILLAGE COMMUNITY EXAMINED IN ITS
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The early surveys of counties in England provided only the largest divisions of land uses: moors, forests, hills, commons; even smaller scale
maps of town areas that showed individual plots still described land
uses such as fen, woods, meers, and mown grounds.125
Even once surveyors began producing pictorial descriptions of estates, drawing in rivers and fields and houses, they continued to note
land uses on the drawings, either by text or by a series of symbols set
out in surveyors’ guidebooks.126 Surveyors labeled areas as meadows,
common pasture, or planted land.127 Guidebooks admonished surveyors to illustrate their woods by “draw[ing] diverse little Trees in the
most material places,” and to use “shadow” to show “mountain[s] and
uneven Grounds with Hills and Valleys.”128 Such land uses divided
properties in both written and visual depictions until surveyors moved
toward modern, geometrical depictions.
B. Boundary Enforcement with Waste Law
1. Waste, Boundaries & Land Use
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RELATIONS TO THE MANORIAL AND TRIBAL SYSTEMS AND TO THE COMMON OR OPEN FIELD
SYSTEM OF HUSBANDRY 375 (4th ed. 1890).
125. See generally MAGNA BRITANNIA ET HIBERNIA (1720) (illustrating English regions
by depicting common land uses).
126. CATHERINE DELANO-SMITH & ROGER J.P. KAIN, ENGLISH MAPS: A HISTORY 24
(1999).
127. Id.
128. 4 LEYBOURN, supra note 103, at 114.
129. Simmons v. Norton (1831) All ER (CPD) 345. See also Simmons v. Norton (1831)
131 Eng. Rep. 247 (CPD).
130. Simmons v. Norton (1831) All ER (CPD) 345.
131. Id.
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In a world without mathematical surveys, land uses efficiently established boundaries. As Chief Justice Tindal explained, “[i]n grants,
land frequently passes by the specific description of meadow, pasture,
arable, or the like.”129 Altering the land use then could “introduce considerable difficulty in the title.”130 Even in 1831, Tindal found that “[i]t
is the daily practice of this court to amend fines and recoveries, on account of the misdescription of the quality of the land; and the ground
for making such amendments is that these documents are preserved
and handed down, as certifying the title to, and identifying the lands,
by reference to the purposes to which they have been applied.”131
Waste law protected the evidence of title through one of its three
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traditional prongs. Traditionally, waste could be proven by (1) “a diminishing of the value of the estate,” (2) “an increasing of the burdens
upon it,” or (3) “an impairing of the evidence of title.”132 The third
function of waste was specifically designed to address land use changes. As Lord Coke explained, changing a land use changes “the evidence of the estate.”133 If the tenant made such a change, he could
“caus[e] a difficulty in afterwards proving the identity of the premises.”134 In a time prior to formalized mathematical surveys and deed
registries, “w[aste] was a matter of great importance,” precisely due to
its ability to protect land from “injury to title.”135 Lord Coke explained
“if the land be described as arable in the deeds and on view the land is
found to be pasture, some special evidence is necessary to prove the
identity.”136
Following the rule strictly, courts forbade material alterations of
buildings, because those buildings were likely a part of the evidence of
title.137 In other words, to change the buildings was to “change the
identity of the estate.”138 For example, in Cole v. Forth, the defendant
“pulled down a brew-house and built a number of small tenements in
lieu thereof.”139 While the court found that the property rent increased
by eighty pounds per year, the Court of King’s Bench determined that
it was “waste notwithstanding the improvement, because of the nature
of the thing and of the evidence was altered.”140 Alterations to a building that did not change its function or overall size and location might
or might not be waste; it was a question for the jury as to whether or
not such a change “affected the evidence of the plaintiff’s title.”141 In
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132. 1 BOONE, supra note 23, at 300.
133. COKE ON LITTLETON § 53 (8th ed. 1822); Simmons v. Norton (1831) All ER 343
(CPD). Simmons explains using this example: “Ploughing old meadow land and converting
it to arable is waste; it alters the evidence of the title.” Id.
134. Young v. Spencer (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 405 (KB) 408.
135. BEWES, supra note 20, at 130.
136. COKE ON LITTLETON § 53b.
137. Liability for Ameliorative Waste, supra note 42, at 1130.
138. JOHN WILLARD, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 373 (1875).
139. Cole v. Forth (1672) 86 Eng. Rep. 759; 1 Mod. 94 (cited in 2 THE REPORTS OF THE
MOST LEARNED SIR EDMUND SAUNDERS 258 (Edward Vaughan Williams ed., 6th ed. 1846)).
140. Id. (quoted in 2 THE REPORTS OF THE MOST LEARNED SIR EDMUND SAUNDERS 258
(Edward Vaughan Williams ed., 6th ed. 1846) 259).
141. Young v. Spencer (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 405 (KB), quoted in 2 SAUNDERS supra note
139, at 259 (finding that the opening of a new door to a building might or might not be
waste, and that it was a question for the jury to decide as to whether the change impact the
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general, however, changes to the size of a building or the construction
of a new building would be waste because “the consequent alteration
in the description of the premises might impair the evidence of the
owner’s title.”142 This included changes to the inside of a building to
the degree that they might no longer align with a title description.143
It did not matter if the landscape change was “compatible with
good husbandry,” only that it had damaged the ability of others to discern the boundaries of the estate. Therefore “cutting down hedges,
which serve as fences, or as the monuments of boundaries, is
Waste.”144 For the same reason, waste occurred with “[t]he conversion
of one species of land into another, as the changing of meadow into arable.”145 A defendant committed waste when he plowed up land that
had been used as pasture.146 Thus, courts would restrain tenants from
ploughing either meadow or pasture ground.147
Because economic value was not the issue and maintenance of
boundary lines through preservation of distinct land uses was paramount, injunctions rather than damage awards were the remedy for
these types of waste actions. In response to suits, the courts would
“award a perpetual injunction to restrain waste by ploughing, burning,
breaking, or sowing of down land.” 148
Cutting down trees potentially offended two of the three waste
prongs.149 Cutting down timber could change the evidence of the estate, by making what was labeled “wood” or “forest” on a land description or map into either meadow or arable land.150 Because
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evidence of title).
142. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 381.
143. BEWES, supra note 20, at 11–13, 167.
144. JAMES SULLIVAN, THE HISTORY OF LAND TITLES IN MASSACHUSETTS 335 (1801).
145. 1 CRUISE, supra note 34, at 67.
146. Gunning v. Gunning (1678) 89 Eng. Rep. 759 (KB).
147. Cole v. Peyson (1637) 21 Eng. Rep. 106; Atkins v. Temple (1626) 21 Eng. Rep. 493
(“A tenant will be restrained at the instance of the owner of the inheritance from ploughing
up ancient pasture; such ploughing is as much waste as the ploughing of meadow.”).
148. 1 CRUISE, supra note 34, at 67.
149. For nineteenth century discussions of the complexities of English law on waste
and timber, see YOOL, supra note 23, at 22–33; BEWES, supra note 20, at 98–102; for the traditional common law rules on timber, see COKE ON LITTLETON § 53a–b (8th ed. 1822). Additionally, not all trees count as timber. The “custom of particular places” determines which
trees are timber. See CHARLES WATKINS, PRINCIPLES OF CONVEYANCING 33 (John Merrifield
ed., 8th ed. 1833) (finding that the definition of timber varied across England, depending on
local custom).
150. Maleverer v. Spinke (1537) 73 Eng. Rep. 79, 80 (holding that removing timber
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boundary-maintenance was the primary purpose, the rule also worked
in reverse—despite the scarcity of timber, it was also waste to change
“arable land into wood.”151 On the other hand, in a country where
timber was scarce, cutting down trees could also reduce the value of
the property significantly. Given that cutting timber potentially offended both prongs of waste, cutting trees generally constituted waste
under the common law.152
The strictness of waste law demonstrates the importance of the
boundary-maintenance function. This is particularly clear in light of
the common law’s normal tendency to prefer arable land to all others.153 Penalizing the ploughing of ancient meadows, an action which
would convert the land into the preferred arable state,154 speaks directly to the vital importance of the land use as a boundary-setting mechanism.
Additionally, recognizing the boundary-maintenance function of
waste law explains certain results, such as treble damages when the
reversioner profited from the property change, that otherwise seem
patently unfair.155 To explain centuries of such rulings by courts otherwise quite interested in a natural concept of fairness or justice, one
must focus on the damage that may have been done to the title and
boundaries of a property through even a financially positive change to
the landscape.
2. The Boundary Maintenance Function and the Good Husbandry
Standard
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damages evidence of title).
151. WILLARD, supra note 138, at 373.
152. 1 BOONE, supra note 23, at 301.
153. Lord Coke wrote upon this subject in multiple contexts. See BEWES, supra note 20,
at 30–31 (quoting and discussing Lord Coke and others on the common law preference for
arable lands). For a further discussion of the common law preference for arable lands, see
Jill Fraley, The Anti-Wilderness Bias in the Common Law & Modern American Property Law
(forthcoming in MODERN STUDIES IN PROPERTY LAW).
154. See Simmons v. Norton (1831) All ER 343 (CPD) 344 (explaining that “ploughing
meadow land and converting it into arable is prima facie waste” and “it alters the evidence
of title”).
155. See BEWES, supra note 20, at 9 (discussing the “merciless” application of the rule,
including treble damages, in cases of ameliorative waste).
156. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 383.
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Some cases confusingly speak of a change in the “course of husbandry” being forbidden by waste law.156 This general statement was
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157. See supra Section III.B.
158. While the court imposed the good husbandry requirement, it was possible for the
parties to “contract themselves out of it.” Tucker v. Linger (1882) 21 Ch D 18 at 24 (Eng.).
159. BEWES, supra note 20, at 38.
160. (1610) 123 Eng. Rep. 806, 806.
161. Id.
162. Powis v. Dorall (1610) 8 Bacon 419.
163. BEWES, supra note 20, at 38.
164. REDMAN, supra note 21, at 257.
165. Powis v. Dorall (1610) 8 Bacon 419.
166. Tucker v. Linger (1882) 21 Ch D 18 at 24 (Eng.).
167. Id.
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a product of more than one of the separate prongs of waste. First, as
we have already discussed, changes in the course of husbandry—if
they rose to the level of a change in land use—would be prohibited because the land use provided evidence of title.157 Changing the course
of husbandry could also impair either the value of the estate or the
burdens upon it. The common law traditionally imposed a good husbandry requirement that prevented changes to the course of husbandry that affected value or increased burdens.158
Changing the course of husbandry could violate the good husbandry standard in a variety of ways. First, farmers understood some
plants to be incompatible with others that might be planted there in
the future. For example, after being planted in woad, land would “not
carry corn for seven years after.”159 Relying on this commonly accepted principle, the plaintiff in Tresham v. Lamb160 alleged waste, in part,
through the tenant sowing woad. As one judge explained, woad was
“offensive and infectious.”161 Others cases agreed, finding that woad
was “of so poisonous a quality that it destroys the principles of vegetation.”162 Some crops were, simply put, “pernicious crops,”163 and
waste law prohibited sowing the land with any such plant.164 As a result, the court would require “an express power in his lease”; otherwise, the tenant would be liable for violating the covenant of good
husbandry.165
Additionally, some agricultural techniques were likely to run afoul
of the good husbandry rule. English courts evaluated changes in the
course of husbandry by inquiring into the agricultural custom of the
area.166 This was not a matter for witness testimony as to their personal beliefs on the best husbandry, but rather a sense of community
common knowledge.167 It was what “ha[s] been publicly done

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 112 Side B

06/19/2017 09:53:44

4 FRALEY-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

886

6/12/17 1:56 PM

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[100:861

throughout the district.”168 Such a standard, the judges agreed, “must
vary exceedingly according to soil, climate, and situation.”169 Across
the country, there was no “uniform course of husbandry,”170 but the
general concept of good husbandry would lay the foundation for the
modern value-focused rule.
3. The Boundary Maintenance Function & Shifting Land Uses
The boundary-function also explains why some English cases, including some of the oldest, do not find waste even though there was a
change in land use.171 In some instances parcels served multiple purposes over the years, often alternating, as between pasture and meadow.172 Normally, the strict rule would dictate a finding of waste when
the tenant changed uses. However, when the land use had already
changed prior to the tenant taking possession, the evidence of the estate was either not given through land use descriptions (but rather
through adjoining roads, streams, etc.), or such evidence of title was
already impaired by longstanding changes in use. Thus, the change in
use was not chargeable to the tenant as waste.
In such cases, the strict per se rule173 for changing land use would
not dictate a finding of waste; the rule only prevented changes that
“touch[ed] the identity of the estate.”174 When the reversioner presented no such evidence, the only remaining question was whether such
land use changes offended good husbandry or reduced the value of
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168. Id.
169. Legh v. Hewitt (1803) 102 Eng. Rep. 789, 791.
170. Id.
171. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 383.
172. See Tresham v. Lamb (1610) 123 Eng. Rep. 806 (finding that, in one parcel at issue,
the land had been pasture, but also “had been mowed and used for meadow for diverse
years,” and therefore finding no waste with respect to that parcel when the tenant sowed
and ploughed it). But see Fermier v. Maund (1637) 21 Eng. Rep. 524, 524 (finding that ancient pasture should not be plowed even though it “may have been formerly plowed,” and
apparently relying on the designation of “ancient pasture” to refuse plowing).
173. When land use descriptions typically determined boundaries, the courts did not
need extensive evidence to conclude that a change in use impaired evidence of the boundaries. Thus, Chief Justice Tindal could write, “All the authorities agree in establishing the
position, that ploughing meadow land and converting it into arable is prima facie waste. . . .
[A]nd one of the reasons given that such an act is waste, is because it alters the evidence of
title.” Simmons v. Norton (1831) All ER 343 (CPD) 344. For this reason, the court could say
that “the ploughing up [of] ancient meadow is, upon the face of it, irreparable waste.”
Johnson v. Goldswaine and Others (1796) 145 Eng. Rep. 1027.
174. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 383.
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the estate.175
Chief Justice Tindal, writing in Simmons v. Norton, explained the
convergence of the two problems to create a rule against changing
land use.176 Justice Tindal cited the fact that such changes could “alter[] the evidence of title,” but also that ploughing a meadow would
change the value of the estate because in such cases “a series of years,
perhaps ages, must elapse, before it can be restored to its original state
and value.”177 As Justice Tindal’s comments suggest, the boundarymaintenance function is not to be regarded as sharply dichotomous
from the value-maintenance function. Maintaining boundaries effectively also directly implicates value. But the additional function of
waste, what I am calling the boundary-maintenance function, directed
itself specifically to preventing changes to boundaries. Only recognizing this distinct function of waste law in maintaining boundaries explains this line of cases.
4. The Boundary Function & Forbidding Waiver
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175. Id.
176. Simmons v. Norton (1831) All ER (CPD) 344–45.
177. Id. at 345.
178. WILLARD, supra note 138, at 381. This clause did not fully protect a tenant from
liability for waste, because courts still often interfered on equity grounds to prevent waste.
For a discussion of the reasons why courts would act in equity to prevent waste despite the
clause, see THOMAS BRETT, LEADING CASES IN MODERN EQUITY 108–13 (J.D. Rogers & J.M.
Dixon eds., 3d ed. 1896).
179. PURDY, supra note 62, at 48. See generally Merrill, supra note 11.
180. PURDY, supra note 62, at 48.
181. Id.
182. (1667) 2 Eq. Ca. ABR. 757.
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In general, a deed or grant of an estate may prevent a tenant from
being held liable for waste by inserting a clause granting the land
“without impeachment of waste.”178 Both Purdy and Merrill engaged
waste law as though it uniformly created a waivable default rule.179
Purdy described the rule as “to begin with, a default rule, always susceptible to contractual revision.”180 Yet, this is not accurate. The
boundary-making function of the old rule was not waivable, even by a
specific provision that prevented impeachment for waste.181 Notably,
English courts would not allow waiver to excuse changes of land use
that implicated boundaries.182 Courts reasoned that, “[t]he Clause of
without Impeachment of Waste, never was extended to allow the very
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183. Id.
184. Findlay v. Smith, 20 Va. 134, 152 (1818) (“In the case of the Bishop of London v.
Webb, 1 P. Wms. 527, where a tenant for years, and that too without impeachment of waste,
contracted with brick makers to dig and work up the soil, thereby converting the pasture
field into a pit or pond, he was [e]njoined by the Chancellor from so doing, because it did a
lasting injury to the inheritance; and this, notwithstanding the clause of impeachment of
waste.”).
185. Atkins v. Temple (1625) 21 Eng. Rep. 493.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See BEWES, supra note 20, at 30–31 (discussing Lord Coke’s explanations of the
common law preference for arable land over all other types); Tyrringham’s Case (1584) 76
Eng. Rep. 973 (including Lord Coke’s footnotes about the common law preference for arable
land).

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 113 Side B

Destruction of the Estate itself.”183 For example, the converting of “a
pasture field into a pit or pond” was restrained by English courts, even
if the tenant was to be held “without impeachment of waste” according to the contract.184
By using a non-waivable waste rule, common law courts could protect more than the interests of the two parties to a suit. Indeed, some
cases introduce wording that suggests directly the stake of the state in
waste cases—a move that would be logical given the boundarymaintenance function.185 In Atkins v. Temple, the court described the
question of waste as not just the question of whether the actions of the
tenant were prejudicial to the reversioner, but also whether they were
prejudicial “to the Commonwealth.”186 Atkins involved an injunction
request to restrain the tenant “from plowing up ancient Meadow and
Pasture Grounds.”187 Particularly given the brevity of the older English cases, one might consider whether the court meant that the prejudice to the commonwealth was some economic or other burden that
plowing these lands would cause. Such an alternative explanation,
however, does not fit given the strong preference in the common law
for arable over pasture-land.188 If the commonwealth could be prejudiced by the tenant’s actions, it was through the destruction of the
proper evidence of boundaries. The fact that the strict rule was nonwaivable in the instance of injury to the evidence of title suggests that
the rule was protecting someone besides the reversioner—potentially
either the interest of the state in preventing property disputes or the
interest of the neighbor in maintaining boundaries.
Finally, making waste non-waivable when it came to the boundary
function mirrors the strict holdings in cases of ameliorative waste,

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 114 Side A

06/19/2017 09:53:44

4 FRALEY-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

A NEW HISTORY OF WASTE LAW

6/12/17 1:56 PM

889

which are discussed in more detail below. In cases of ameliorative
waste, where the property changes impaired boundary evidence,
courts dispensed treble damages, even while the reversioner profited
from the property change.189 Such strict applications of the common
law rule again suggest that courts were protecting a state interest as
well as the reversioner’s interest.
IV. A NEW HISTORY OF WASTE LAW: THE EVOLUTION TO THE MODERN
RULE IN BOTH BRITISH AND AMERICAN COURTS
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189. See BEWES, supra note 20, at 9 (discussing treble damages in cases of ameliorative
waste).
190. DELANO-SMITH & KAIN, supra note 126, at 117.
191. 1 FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 258 (W. Keith
Kavenagh ed., 1983).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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Delineating boundaries through textual descriptions and land usage was, of course, a risky business, and one that would inevitably be
replaced by more efficient technologies. An accurate map meant that
it was possible not to worry about what would later be jokingly called
“the scandalous replacement of arable [land] by pasture.” 190
Throughout the seventeenth century, colonists employed the same
methods of marking boundaries as had been initially used in England:
by referencing natural landmarks or landscape features and land uses.191 However, given that the land was not inscribed with land uses in
the same way that parcels were in England, colonists relied much
more heavily on landscape features as opposed to land uses.192 A 1640
survey of Massachusetts land for William Bradford demonstrates the
use of landscape features.193 Bradford’s land extended “from the
bounds of Yarmouth three miles to the eastward of Naemskeckett, and
from sea to sea, cross the said neck of land . . . and two miles to the
western side of the said river to another place called Acqussent River.”194 Similarly, a purchase of Newark in 1667 from native tribes was
described as
bounded easterly by a great creek that runs from Hackingsack Bay through the salt meadow called by the Indians Wequahick and now known by the name of
Bound Creek, and continuing from the head of the said
creek to the head of a cove to a marked tree, from
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thence it extended westerly upon a straight line, by
computation seven miles to the same more or less, to
the end or foot of the great mountain and to the ridge
thereof called by the Indians Wacchung.195
Landscape features replaced land uses as the basis for written
metes and bounds.196 Whether the description of the land was verbal
or visual, land uses no longer provided the same social function of
maintaining boundary lines between neighboring parcels.197 Changes
in the scale of grants, the types of landscapes being conveyed, and the
technology of surveying itself, which increasingly moved toward the
visual representation of land and mathematical measurements, meant
that waste law no longer needed to protect boundaries.198 Rather than
engaging in more detail the story of the modernization of surveying
methods, this Article now turns to the story of the shift in English and
American waste law, which will allow the cases themselves to point to
the transformations in technology.
A. Transforming Waste Law in England
Wyndham Bewes places the turning point in English waste law at
Huntley v. Russell, decided in 1849,199 which permitted tearing down
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195. 2 FOUNDATIONS OF COLONIAL AMERICA, supra note 191, at 1494.
196. See supra Section III.A.
197. See supra Section III.A.
198. See supra Section III.A.
199. BEWES, supra note 20, at 130. Bewes and his treatise summaries of English law
were well regarded by contemporaries. See 3 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 18 (2d ed. 1832) (listing Bewes among the most distinguished of English treatise writers). A contemporaneous review found that Bewes’ book “[could not] fail to be of service to
the profession,” having “dealt exhaustively” with a topic that is both “complex and difficult.” Review: The Law of Waste, 21 Q.J. JURIS. 95–96 (1895–96).
American cases, including Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., the case that Merrill believes is the
quintessential American case, rely on Bewes for the authoritative interpretation of English
waste law. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 10, 79 N.W. 738, 739 (1899).
In the early twentieth century, the other major treatise writers relied on Bewes’ work when
discussing the law of waste. For example, Herbert Thondike Tiffany repeatedly cites Bewes
in his discussion of waste law. 1 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT 711,
713, 730, 737 (1912). See also EDWARD DOUGLAS ARMOUR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 93 (2d ed. 1916); JOSHUA WILLIAMS & THOMAS CYPRIAN WILLIAMS, PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 115, 497 (20th ed. 1906). Notably, even modern American cases
still rely on Bewes when seeking an authoritative position on the traditional English rules of
waste. See Dodds v. Sixteenth Section Dev. Corp., 99 So. 2d 897 (Miss. 1958); Vollertsen v.
Lamb, 732 P.2d 486, 494 (Or. 1987) (relying on Bewes to determine which parties may be
liable for waste); State v. Delinquent Taxpayers, No. M2004-00951-COA-R3-CV, 2006 Tenn.
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App. LEXIS 716, *22 n.11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2006) (relying on Bewes to determine what
conduct constitutes waste).
200. BEWES, supra note 20, at 130 (quoting Huntley v. Russell (1849) 116 Eng. Rep. 1381
(KB) 1387).
201. Huntley v. Russell (1849) 116 Eng. Rep. 1381 (KB) 1387; see Greene v. Cole (1669)
85 Eng. Rep. 1037 (KB) 1047.
202. Huntley, 116 Eng. Rep. 1387; see Greene 85 Eng. Rep. 1037.
203. Huntley, 116 Eng. Rep. 1388.
204. Id.
205. BEWES, supra note 20, at 131.
206. Id.
207. Jones v. Chappell [1875] 20 LR Eq. 539 (Eng.) 541-42.
208. 3 EDWARDS, supra note 25, at 68.
209. BEWES, supra, note 20, at 131–32.
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and rebuilding a barn because “[t]he evidence of title could in no way
be affected.”200 The parties argued Cole v. Greene, which had held that
“substituting new and different buildings for old ones is waste.”201
Distinguishing that case, Justice Erle notes that in Cole, “the identity of
the property was lost, and the evidence of the landlord’s right destroyed.”202 Delivering the opinion of the court, Justice Patteson explained the ruling by saying that with respect to the three prongs of
waste law, “one of these three requisites exists.”203 Title, the court concluded, “could in no way be affected” by removing an addition to a
house, with “that house being still standing.”204
By 1875, in Jones v. Chappell, an English court reasoned, “[y]ou may
prove an injury in the sense of destroying identity, by what is called
destroying evidence of the owner’s title, and that is a very peculiar
head of the law, which has not been extended in modern times.”205
Jones concluded that the building of a new building was not per se
waste, because the old per se rule regarding evidence of title no longer
applied.206 Instead, the court held that the question is whether the new
building offends either of the two remaining prongs of the waste test;
the plaintiff must prove an injury through either a destruction of value
or an increase in burdens.207 Citing Jones, treatise writers found that it
was “now settled” that English courts had adopted the new rule.208
Writing in 1878 for the Court of Appeal, in Doherty v. Allman, Lord
O’Hagan explained the change.209 Lord O’Hagan found that “owing to
the circumstances in which property is now situated in this country, in
Scotland, and in Ireland, evidence of title of this kind is not at all of the
same importance as it was in other times and other circumstances.
When you have an Ordnance Survey, when you have a Registry of
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210. Id.
211. Id. at 133 (quoting Doherty v. Allman [1878] 3 App. Cas. 709 (HL) 735 (Eng.) (appeal taken from N. Ir.).
212. Purdy, supra note 9, at 664 n.66.
213. BEWES, supra note 20, at 13.
214. Purdy, supra note 9, at 664 n.66.
215. BEWES, supra note 20, at 130.
216. Id.
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Deeds, when you have a system of conveyancing, the value of evidence of title, of a place of this sort retaining its particular position, is
very sensibly diminished.”210 Lord Blackburn concurred, reasoning
that
when there are Ordnance Surveys, and where, as in Ireland, there is a Court especially dealing with the titles to
estates, giving titles, and where the property is marked
out on a map, which map can be identified with the
Ordnance map—and these maps it may well be supposed will continue to exist and may be referred to the
end of the term—any damage in regard to evidence of
title is quite wild and chimerical, or is at least merely
nominal.211
Purdy has cited Meux v. Cobley, a case from 1892, to suggest that
England still enforced the traditional common law rule, if in a roundabout way, by utilizing a covenant within a lease “to avoid finding
waste in cases of industrial development or improving buildings.”212
Others have been less pessimistic about the court’s motivations.
Bewes, writing only a few years after the court decided Meux, interpreted the case as an outlier in English jurisprudence, a special case of
“contract by which the tenant of a property, demised by words describing its character, is taken to have impliedly contracted to preserve
its nature, as demised.”213 While Purdy concluded that the English
courts “continued . . . to treat changes in the course of husbandry as injuries to the inheritance,”214 Bewes would have disagreed. Rather
than crediting the court with ulterior motives in Meux, Bewes looked
to the longer line of English cases, dating back to 1849,215 and concluded that English courts had already adopted the new rule.216 Bewes
summarizes,
It seems fair nowadays, as a matter of arrangement, to
treat w[aste] founded on injury to title as a possible variety of trivial w[aste]. Not that there may not be, even
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now, cases in which injunction may be granted or damages awarded on this ground; but that, in by far the
largest number of instances, confusion of title is so
slight as to be disregarded.217
Judge Kekewich, writing in the Meux decision, agreed with Bewes,
finding that the English law had already changed.218 He described the
transformation as “borne out by many cases,”219 including Harrow
School v. Alderton (1800),220 Jones v. Chappell (1875),221 and Doherty v.
Allman (1878).222 This interpretation is supported not only by Bewes’
distinguished treatise on The Law of Waste in England,223 but also by a
Harvard Law Review article from 1930, which describes the shift in law
as occurring first in England, and later, slowly in the United States.224
To a certain degree, it doesn’t perhaps even make sense to describe the
English changes as a transformation—the English rule more properly
simply doubled down on the part of the waste rule that had always existed and continued to be useful (the value portion of the rule), while
setting aside the other portion of the rule (the boundary portion),
which was made obsolete by surveying technology.
B. The Transformation of Waste Law in America
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217. Id. at 129–30.
218. Meux v. Cobley [1892] 2 Ch 253 (Eng.) 263.
219. Id.
220. 126 Eng. Rep. 1170. Harrow involved the tenant “converting three closes of meadow into garden ground.” Id. at 1170. In Harrow, the court said that “if the jury gave only one
farthing damages for each close, the [c]ourt would give [d]efendant leave to enter up judgment for himself.” Id. It appears the jury entered nominal damages. Nominal damages are
not ordinarily available in waste actions. BEWES, supra note 20, at 130.
221. (1875) 20 LR Eq. 539 (Eng.).
222. (1878) 3 App. Cas. 709 (H.L.) (appeal taken from N. Ir.).
223. BEWES, supra note 20, at 13.
224. Liability for Ameliorative Waste, supra note 42, at 1131.
225. Pynchon v. Stearns, 52 Mass. 304, 311 (1846).
226. Id.
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A case called Pynchon v. Stearns signaled the shift of waste law in
America.225 In 1846, the Massachusetts Supreme Court explained,
“[w]hen our ancestors emigrated to this country, they brought with
them, and were afterwards governed by, the common law of England;
excepting, however, such parts as were inapplicable to their new condition.”226 Within America “it has been the constant usage of our
farmers to break up their grass lands for the purpose of raising crops
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Sprankling, supra note 8, at 534.
MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 383.
Id.
(1610) 123 Eng. Rep. 806, 806.
Pynchon, 52 Mass. at 311; MATTHEW BACON & HENRY GWILLIM, A NEW
ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 252 (6th ed. 1807); JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 667 (5th ed. 1826).
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by tillage, and laying them down again to grass, and otherwise to
change the use and cultivation of their lands, as occasions have required.”227 Such changes were acceptable, because they were not
“changes upon the evidence of title to lands.”228 Waste actions, preventing changes to land use, were no longer necessary because “[t]he
land conveyed is described by metes and bounds, or by some general
and certain description of its limits, without any designation of the
kind of land conveyed, whether it be arable land or grass land, wood
land or cleared land, pasture or meadow.”229 Such a rule was “unsuited to wilderness conditions”230 not because industry required the cutting of trees, but because in wilderness conditions land uses could not
effectively designate boundaries.
Despite the court’s flowery rhetoric on the American innovation,
the court cited and directly relied upon a long-standing line of English
cases that were in perfect agreement. In cases dating back to the early
1600s the English courts had held that the strict common law rule only
prevented those changes that “touch[ed] the identity of the estate.”231
The rule had long allowed that when land historically fluctuated, there
was no damage when the current tenant changed the use again.232 In
Tresham v. Lamb,233 for example, the court found that where the land
had been pasture, but also “had been mowed and used for meadow
for diverse years,” there was no waste with respect to that parcel when
the tenant sowed and ploughed it. In Pynchon, the Massachusetts Supreme Court specifically followed this line of cases, a line that had
long been cited in two traditional English treatises that detailed the
rule allowing for changes in land that had been previously changed:
John Comyn’s A Digest of the Laws of England, along with Matthew Bacon and Henry Gwillim’s A New Abridgement of the Law.234 The rule,
according to Bacon and Gwillim, was that “if a meadow be sometimes
arable, and sometimes meadow, and sometimes pasture, there, the
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235. MATTHEW BACON & HENRY GWILLIM, A NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW 252 (6th
ed. 1807).
236. JOHN COMYNS, A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 667 (5th ed. 1826).
237. MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 383.
238. Pynchon, 52 Mass. at 311.
239. Clemence v. Steere, 1 R.I. 272 (1850)
240. Id. at 274.
241. Id. at 276.
242. Id.
243. See id. at 277.
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ploughing of it is not waste.”235 Comyn’s treatise similarly finds that
where the use of land has changed “where it was sometimes pasture,
and sometimes arable,” there is no waste.236 The argument that Justice
Wilde makes in his Pynchon opinion, relies directly on this longstanding rule: changes only counted as waste if they “touch[ed] the identity
of the estate.”237 Where the land use fluctuated, it could not be the
source of the identity of the estate; there was no reason to punch another change in land use as waste. In Pynchon, this is precisely Justice
Wilde’s reasoning: the strict rule against land use changes didn’t apply
to the American wilderness because metes and bounds instead of land
uses delineated boundaries.238 Rather than elaborating a new rule,
Pynchon endorsed one dating back centuries in English jurisprudence.
A second influential case closely followed Pynchon. In 1850, the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island followed the Massachusetts example.239 In Clemence v. Steere, the court found:
The defendant is charged with having converted meadow into pasture land. In England this would be waste.
But we are not to apply the English law too strictly.
Our lands are in many respects cultivated differently
from land in England; and this difference is to be taken
into account. Here it is necessary to show that the
change is detrimental to the inheritance and contrary to
the ordinary course of good husbandry. If in this case
the change injured the farm, or was such a change as no
good farmer would make, it was waste.240
Additionally, the court failed to award any damages for waste
when the defendant tore down a house that was alleged “not to be
reparable, or so dilapidated that the expense of repairing would be beyond the value of the house.”241 The court did find that “[w]hatever
may have been its value, the reversioner had a right to it,”242 but no
damages were awarded for razing the house.243
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Proffitt v. Henderson, 29 Mo. 325, 327–28 (1860).
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Id.
Cannon v. Barry, 59 Miss. 289, 303 (1881).
Id. at 297, 303.
Id. at 298.
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Id.
Id.
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The Missouri Supreme Court re-evaluated the traditional waste
rule in 1860: the court held that it was not “waste in this country to
convert arable land into meadow.”244 This conclusion came from the
court reasoning that “cutting timber and clearing land may, so far
from being waste, often enhance the value of the inheritance.”245 This
did not mean, however, that changing the course of husbandry would
never be waste. The court continued the traditional good husbandry
standard, finding that, “there is a due and reasonable medium to be
observed according to the custom of farmers. To cut down all the timber on a tract of land and sell it would be waste because it would be
detrimental to the inheritance.”246
Cannon v. Barry, a Mississippi Supreme Court case from 1881, concluded that the English law was “inapplicable” to the new American
context.247 While the court does not explain exactly what makes the
rule inexplicable, the attorney’s arguments from the case demonstrate
how the boundary function of English waste law was not needed in
America.248 The attorney explains that, “[t]he common law doctrine
that anything is waste which impairs the evidence of title, as drawing
in fences, has no application in this country, where the lands are described by land-office numbers.”249 In Cannon, the defendant had
cleared thirty to forty acres, and in doing so he “freely cut and used
the growing timber on the place, of which there is a superabundance
for this and all other purposes.”250 The court concluded that the defendant “has unquestionably been guilty of that which would be
deemed waste under the English authorities, but which we cannot
pronounce to be such under the state of things existing with us, and
under the circumstances of this case.”251 The court reasoned that “[t]he
condition of this country and that of England are wholly dissimilar,
and that which would be a safe test there is altogether inapplicable
here.”252 In England, the very changing of the use of land from woodland to arable would have been, unquestionably, waste. It would have
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been perhaps the safest of tests for waste. As the attorney argued
though, the rule was no longer necessary where land boundaries were
precisely recorded.253
In 1888, in Hubble v. Cole,254 the Virginia Supreme Court considered
a case involving the erection of a new building and a potential change
in the course of husbandry. While the court was unsure based on the
evidence if there truly was a change in the course of husbandry, the
court did not even consider applying the traditional rule forbidding
changes outright, which would have been non-waivable.255
In 1903, Tiffany’s treatise Real Property finds that “[i]n former times,
some acts were regarded as waste merely because they changed the
appearance of the land, and so impaired the evidence of title thereto,
but, with the adoption of improved methods of identifying land, this
can no longer be regarded as waste.”256 Tiffany cites both Melms and
Pynchon, among other cases.257 By 1920, Tiffany’s treatise speaks all the
more firmly of this change.258 Tiffany described the old rule, saying
that the reason for the rule was that a change in husbandry “render[ed] the proof of title more difficult.”259 Tiffany describes this reason as “inapplicable in this country” because “land is almost invariably, at the present day, described by metes and bounds or courses and
distances, or by reference to a plat or survey, and not by its particular
character.”260
C. The Transformation of Waste Law in America: Treatise Formalization
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Id. at 297.
7 S.E. 242 (1888).
Id.
HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY AND OTHER INTERESTS
IN LAND § 247 (1903).
257. Id. § 247 n.175.
258. 1 TIFFANY, supra note 41, at 954.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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As these cases demonstrate, while later courts at times simply parroted the precedents, earlier American decisions explained their logic
in terms of the demise of one prong of the waste rule: the boundarymaintenance function. Treatise authors recognized the same reasoning
for the change.
Writing in 1894, Wyndham Anstis Bewes composed a thorough
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BEWES, supra note 20.
Id. at 18–30, 130–38.
Id. at 29–30, 130.
Id. at 130 (citing Huntley v. Russell (1849) 116 Eng. Rep. 1381 (KB)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 29–30.
1 BOONE, supra note 23, at 307.
MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2, § 383.
Id.
BLAKEMORE, supra note 23, at 327.
Id.

06/19/2017 09:53:44

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 118 Side B

treatise on the law of waste.261 Bewes explained old and new rules of
waste and their history of adoption in England as well as the United
States.262 Notably, Bewes dates both English and American adoptions
of the new rule to roughly the same time period.263 Bewes cites the
“turn of the tide” in England as 1849, with Huntley v. Russell.264 Huntley involved the tearing down of a barn and building of another in a
different location (“a mile away”).265 The court concluded that this
was not waste, because “[t]he evidence of title could in no way be affected.”266
When Bewes considered American case law, he determined that
American courts were also adopting the new rule. Bewes cited Pynchon v. Stearns and Clemence v. Steere as the leading American cases that
break with the English common law tradition,267 thus placing the shift
in the United States at the mid-1800s.
Most other treatise writers were less thorough in their discussions,
and therefore less specific in placing the date of transformation. They
were, however, clear that the new rule was well ensconced by the turn
of the twentieth century. Charles Theodore Boone, writing in 1901,
found that waste law in the United States depended on determining
the change in the property’s value through the good husbandry standard.268 Writing in 1910, Minor detailed the American adoption of the
new rule.269 Minor explained that as for changes in land use “touching
the identity of the estate,” this “reason would be generally of little
weight in the United States.”270 Blakemore, writing in 1917, explained
that the original waste rule prevented changes in land use because
such usages gave “evidences of title.”271 Blakemore concluded that
American courts had largely abandoned this rule.272 Blakemore noted
that the old rule was unnecessary “on account of our system of deeds
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and registries of deeds.”273
D. The Transformation of Waste Law in America: Understanding the Shift
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273. Id.
274. See supra Sections IV.B, IV.C.
275. See Young v. Spencer (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 405 (KB).
276. Id.
277. “To pull down a house and rebuild it less than before is certainly waste; and it
seems at common law to be no less waste to rebuild it greater than before, because, it is
said, it is to the prejudice of the owner of the inheritance, for it is more charge to repair! A
better reason is that the consequent alteration in the description of the premises might impair the evidence of the owner’s title. Indeed, Lord Coke holds it to be waste even to build a
new house where there was none before. But in England, at least, this seems to be no longer
the rule if the value of the land has been increased by the rebuilding—a doctrine much
more conformable to modern ideas of justice and reason.” MINOR & WURTS, supra note 2,
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This new history of waste law departs from previous accounts in
two key ways. First, while traditional accounts have maintained that
the shift was a radical American break with British tradition, the new
history describes a shift that is parallel in both countries. The new history concludes that there is little reason to think of the new rule as distinctively American. Second, the new history disputes the traditional
account of transformation as fueled by the pressures of land development. Rather, this new history explains how both British and American courts shifted to adopt the new rule when the old one’s strict
boundary maintenance function was made obsolete by technological
developments. This Section discusses each of these two key points in
further detail.
First, to examine the new rule and illuminate its consistencies with
both the original common law rule and the modern British rule, it is
appropriate to begin with the concept of ameliorative waste. Ameliorative waste lies at the heart of the change. Under the old rule, ameliorative waste was forbidden; under the new rule it is permissible.274
The strict rule against ameliorative waste emerged directly from a fear
of a tenant destroying evidence of title.275 As Young v. Spencer explained, “A tenant has no right to make any alteration to the demised
premises; not even that which may improve their value, if such an alteration will affect the evidence of the landlord’s title,” thus potentially
causing a difficulty in afterwards proving the identity of the premises.276 It was this one prong—evidence of title—of the three-prong
waste test that made adding positive value punishable when the tenant’s actions otherwise passed the remaining prongs.277 If, on the other
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§ 381 (internal citations omitted).
278. Young v. Spencer (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 405 (KB).
279. Doe v. Burlington (1833) 110 ER 878 (KB).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. BEWES, supra note 20, at 138–39.
283. Huntley v. Russell 116 Eng. Rep. 1381 (KB) 1381.
284. Id. at 1388.
285. Id. at 1382.
286. BEWES, supra note 20, at 129–30.
287. Id. at 134.
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hand, the alteration increased the value of the property, under the old
rule the next question was for the jury to determine: whether the
change damaged the reversioner’s ability to prove the boundaries.278
This is because it may be an act which would increase the value of the
estate, yet be injurious to the inheritance, as it may impair the evidence
of title.279 When there was no problem with impairing the evidence of
title, ameliorative waste need not be punished under the remaining
two prongs.280 If the tenant “pulled down a barn,” it was not waste, if
the jury find that the premises are not damaged.281
Indeed, the two functions of waste law—boundary-maintenance
and value-maintenance—explain some otherwise anomalous results.
Not all common law cases held that it was waste to erect new buildings;282 logically, such acts did not have to constitute waste. If they
added value to the property and did not overburden it, and the property was not designated in title by the location or function of the buildings, then new buildings might have no impact on the evidence of title.283 In such cases, ameliorating waste would not have offended the
three-pronged common law test.284 Such reasoning of the English
courts allowed tenants to construct temporary buildings that were
placed on stilts or rocks, so long as they were “removable at will” and
“not fixed into the ground.”285
English courts specifically connected their omission of the boundary-maintenance prong of waste to their acceptance of ameliorating
waste. Having no need for waste law to maintain boundaries, English
courts determined “nowadays, as a matter of arrangement, to treat
w[aste] founded on injury to title as a possible variety of trivial
w[aste].”286 Then, “[i]t follows by an a fortiori argument that if a tenant
be not punishable for trivial w[aste], neither is he for meliorating, and
this is established by abundance of authority.”287 Others have fol-
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288. Liability for Ameliorative Waste, supra note 42, at 1130.
289. Greene v. Cole 85 Eng. Rep. 1037 (KB).
290. Id. at 1047.
291. Id.
292. See generally HORTWITZ, supra note 6, at 54–55; Sprankling, supra note 8, at 533–35;
Purdy, supra note 9.
293. See generally HORTWITZ, supra note 6, at 54–55; Sprankling, supra note 8, at 533–35;
Purdy, supra note 9.
294. HORTWITZ, supra note 6, at 54–55; Sprankling, supra note 8, at 533; Purdy, supra
note 9.

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 120 Side A

lowed this approach, connecting the strict common law rule with the
rule against “even ameliorative changes.”288 In Barret v. Barret, the
court found that the only way for waste to exist is for it to be prejudicial to the inheritance.289 Expounding on this premise, the Court of
King’s Bench in Cole v. Greene found that for an act to be injurious to
the inheritance, it must do so by one of three ways: “by diminishing
the value of the estate, or, secondly by increasing the burthen upon it,
or, thirdly, by impairing the evidence of title.”290 The court then determined that in the case of pulling down old buildings and replacing
them with new ones, if “the value of the reversion might be increased
by the alteration; it was, therefore, a question for the jury” as to
whether waste occurred.291 If the court omitted the issue of evidence
of the title, the common law rule simply became the two remaining
factors: increase of burden on the property or diminishment the value
of the estate.
American courts followed the same approach, omitting the boundary-maintenance prong and keeping the other two.292 American courts
omitted the boundary-maintenance prong for precisely the same reason as the English courts: it was increasingly superfluous given the
technical and professional developments in surveying and the registration of deeds.293
A second point on which the new account would disagree with
traditional narratives is the idea that the change was fueled by the
need to develop land. Horwitz, Sprankling, and Purdy’s accounts
share a common approach: each cites development pressures to explain the origins of that rule.294 As an initial point, each explanation
assumes—incorrectly—that American courts were doing something
distinct that was a great contrast to the approach of British courts.
Sprankling, for example, argued that American judges were
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Sprankling, supra note 8, at 536.
PURDY, supra note 62, at 46–47.
Sprankling, supra note 8, at 535.
Id. at 536.
Pynchon v. Stearns, 52 Mass. 304, 311 (1846).
Drown v. Smith, 52 Me. 141, 144 (1862).
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“creat[ing] a uniquely American jurisprudence.”295 As we have seen,
little evidence supports this idea. Setting this aside, however, there are
other reasons to doubt the development-fueled narrative.
Recall that Horwitz used waste law as a primary example of a larger trend in American law, the transformation of law to foster economic
development.296 Sprankling found that American courts “merely
eroded the traditional rule; melding rationales based on economic necessity and presumed owner intent.”297 As for the American change,
Purdy
contend[s] that U.S. courts refashioned the English law
of waste for several reasons: to promote efficient use of
resources that the English law would have inhibited; to
advance an idea of American landholding as a republican enterprise, free of feudal hierarchy; and because of a
belief that the cultivation of wild land underlay the Anglo-American claim to North America.298
The traditional narrative of jettisoning the English law at the American Revolution in favor of a more development-friendly rule that allowed timber cutting has often relied on rhetoric from cases that described the English rule as “inapplicable” or no longer fitted to the
“new country.” Sprankling cited courts that described the English rule
as “wholly inapplicable”299 and instead found that the English rule had
to be “varied and accommodated to our new and comparatively unsettled country.”300 While indeed some American cases cite the economic
need to cultivate land as a reason for adjusting the English rule, many
of the cases describing the English rule as “inapplicable” rely on Pynchon v. Stearns, which, as previously discussed, specifically rejected the
English rule because it no longer served the boundary-maintenance
function.301 Drown v. Smith, for example, adopted the new American
rule in Maine, finding the English rule “inapplicable to this country”
and relying on Pynchon.302
Waste actions, preventing changes to land use, were no longer nec-
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essary because “[t]he land conveyed is described by metes and
bounds, or by some general and certain description of its limits, without any designation of the kind of land conveyed, whether it be arable
land or grass land, wood land or cleared land, pasture or meadow.”303
Or, as the attorney in Cannon v. Barry noted, “The common law doctrine that anything is waste which impairs the evidence of title, as
drawing in fences, has no application in this country, where the lands
are described by land-office numbers.”304 Tiffany’s treatise, The Law of
Real Property and Other Interests in Land summarized the adoption of
the new rule, explaining that “[i]n former times, some acts were regarded as waste merely because they changed the appearance of the
land, and so impaired the evidence of title thereto, but, with the adoption of improved methods of identifying land, this can no longer be regarded as waste.”305 Where “land is almost invariably, at the present
day, described by metes and bounds or courses and distances, or by
reference to a plat or survey, and not by its particular character,”306
there is no need for a strict rule prohibiting changes in land use because they impaired evidence of title. Minor explained in his treatise
on property law that, as for changes in land use “touching the identity
of the estate,” this “reason [for punishing a change of land use] would
be generally of little weight in the United States.”307 With respect to
the changes in technology, Minor noted, “lands are commonly described by metes and bounds, and seldom by the character which they
happen to have at the time, as arable, pasture, etc.”308
In Melms, when the Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the modern
rule, the court specifically noted that the old rule served a purpose in
law that was no longer administratively or scientifically necessary.309
When it came to impairing the evidence of title, it had been “a cogent
and persuasive [rule] in former times,” but with modernization, it
“ha[d] lost most, if not all, of its force . . . .”310 The rule was no longer
needed in a world with “accurate surveys and the establishment of the
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311. Id.
312. Id.
313. Purdy summarizes Sprankling’s approach as “contend[ing] that an ‘instrumentalist’ view of the natural world, coupled with a perceived imperative to bring the new continent under the ax and plow, led to the good husbandry standard, which allowed tenants to
clear and develop land in the interests of advancing cultivation.” PURDY, supra note 62, at
46.
314. YOOL, supra note 23, at 8; BEWES, supra note 20, at 12–13.
315. BEWES, supra note 20, at 13.
316. Id. at 32.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 131–34.
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system of recording conveyances.”311 In such a context, when it came
to changes on the physical landscape, the court concluded that “there
can be few acts which will impair any evidence of title.”312 Like the
English courts, American courts no longer needed waste law to perform the boundary-maintenance function. New technologies and professional surveyors, along with deed registration systems, performed
this function and did so with greater accuracy. The American courts,
like the English courts, had determined to dispense with the prong of
the waste test that maintained boundaries.
Sprankling has argued that the good husbandry standard was chosen by the American courts, making a break with English courts, primarily to advance land development.313 But the evidence here shows
that by relying on the two remaining prongs of the old rule, American
courts maintained significant continuities with older British cases, beginning with their use of the good husbandry standard. Indeed, “good
husbandry” became the operative phrase for the new rule. As previously discussed, British cases applied a standard of “due and husbandlike management” to determine whether waste occurred.314 Because
good husbandry provided evidence of damage to the property’s value—one of the two central prongs of waste—courts invoked this implied standard even in negotiated contracts such as agricultural leases315 and even without specific covenants.316 Courts implied a rule that
a tenant was “bound to manage his agricultural land in a husband-like
way according to the custom of the country.”317 The good husbandry
standard was not a new invention for the English courts, but rather
one that dated to the oldest cases on waste.318 Maleverer v. Spinke
(1538) found that while the tenant could not “convert land into wood,
or wood into arable land,” he could “root up bushes, furze, and thorns
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growing upon the land, for melioration, for that is good husbandry.”319
Like the American courts, the English courts continued after the
rule change to use the good husbandry standard to evaluate value
changes. For example, in Hubble v. Cole, the plaintiff alleged that the
defendant was “plowing up 80 or 90 acres of river bottom,” and that it
“would require the same to be mowed or grazed, and not cultivated
for gain crops,” and additionally that “this land lies immediately in the
middle fork of Holston river, and, in times of high water, is subject to
overflow, and, if plowed three years in succession, in all probability
would be injured by floods and water beyond estimate and beyond
reparation.”320 In such circumstances, good husbandry indicated that
the value of the land had been damaged by the acts of the tenant.321
Good husbandry went hand in hand with value change, which had
always been one of the quintessential means of proving waste under
English common law.322 It continued to be so under the new rule both
in England and in America.
Given that land use conditions varied greatly between the two
countries, the development-driven narrative endorsed by Horwitz,
Sprankling, and Purdy fails to account very effectively for the strong
consistency between the English and American shifts. On the other
hand, both jurisdictions similarly experienced the changes that occurred through the professionalization and modernization of surveying, along with the creation of accurate legal mechanisms for recording
boundary and title details.
V. THE NEW HISTORY AND THE TIMING OF THE DOCTRINAL SHIFT
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06/19/2017 09:53:44

319. Quoted in BEWES, supra note 20, at 134.
320. Hubble v. Cole, 7 S.E. 242, 242 (1888). In this case, the court applied not the English common law regarding good husbandry generally, but rather interpreted a provision in
the lease which provided that “the lands shall be farmed in a way to prevent injury to the
same.” Id. at 243.
321. Id. at 244–45.
322. YOOL, supra note 23, at 2.
323. HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 30.
324. Id. at 54.
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Horwitz found that American waste law by 1820 “bore only the
faintest resemblance” to the law before the Revolution.323 Temporally,
he specifically locates the catalyst as “the moment of independence
from England.”324 Sprankling, similarly, contrasts an English rule with
an American law whose emergence he places around the time of the
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Revolution.325 Purdy separates the English and American adoption of
the new rule, saying that the English change “came for quite distinct
reasons, and long after American law had completed its break from
English doctrine.”326 Additionally, Purdy’s contrast of the American
and English rules and construction of the civic republic narrative suggests that the American doctrine did, in fact, shift with or near the
American Revolution.327
Only a couple of early cases, such as Jackson v. Brownson, on which
Purdy substantially relies,328 consider deviating from the English
rule.329 Those cases are not only limited to a couple of jurisdictions,
but also, as the New Hampshire Supreme Court observes, to circumstances where the court is interpreting a contract, in particular a short
term lease of undeveloped land.330 Rather than concluding that other
jurisdictions had wholly “jettisoned” the English law, as Sprankling
would have us believe, the New Hampshire court saw a much more
mediated response from the American courts.331 Short term leases
provided a very specific context—one where it was illogical for the lessee to anticipate making a financial gain from the land unless he could
either cut timber or clear land for cultivation. Logically, “[i]f lands are
leased to a lessor in an uncultivated state, he must of necessity have
the power to clear; otherwise, the lease would be of no profit or advantage to him.”332 Moreover, such circumstances were analogous to
the English rule that allowed for a tenant to work open mines even if
they were not mentioned within a lease—the need for economic gain
from the lease was inferred.333 If a tenant intended to live on the un-
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325. Sprankling, supra note 8, at 534–35.
326. Purdy, supra note 9, at 664–65.
327. See id. at 668.
328. Id. at 661. Purdy describes Jackson v. Brownson as the “watershed” case in American waste law.
329. Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. 227, 336 (N.Y. 1810).
330. Chase v. Hazelton, 7 N.H. 171, 177–78 (1834).
331. Id.
332. Ward v. Sheppard, 3 N.C. 283 (1803).
333. Findlay v. Smith, 20 Va. 134, 143 (1818). While one judge, Judge Cabell, spoke of
the need to accommodate waste law “to the situation of our new and unsettled country,” he
made this statement specifically in the context of acknowledging that the English rule already “varies and accommodates itself to the varying wants and situations of the different
counties in that country” rather than announcing a great break with the common law. Id. at
142. Even at that, Judge Cabell’s comments appears to be primarily dicta; he makes his decision not so much based on the law of waste, but rather by focusing on the intent of the testator. Id. at 146.
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Parkins v. Coxe, 3 N.C. 517 (1805).
Chase, 7 N.H. at 178.
Jackson v. Brownson, 7 Johns. 227 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810).
Id. at 237.
Senteney v. United Embroidery Co., 159 So. 252, 255 (Ala. 1935).
White v. Cutler, 17 Pick. 248, 250 (Mass. 1836).
Id.
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334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
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developed land during the lease, then the tenant had a reasonable expectation to be able to clear enough land “for the necessary support of
his family.”334 Still, only a handful of such cases exist; the majority of
jurisdictions applied the strict English rule well beyond the turn of the
century.
As for Jackson v. Brownson, rather than seeing a watershed case, as
Purdy argues, the New Hampshire Supreme Court saw the holding in
Jackson as limited to the circumstances of a lease of undeveloped
land.335 As a potential watershed case for American law, Jackson has a
more problematic flaw: In Jackson v. Brownson the parties agreed that
the lease contemplated clearing land, leaving the only question as
whether the tenant “committed waste thereon by clearing and draining off the land more than a reasonable and due proportion of the
wood.”336 As a result, the question of whether or not the law of New
York would find the clearing of undeveloped land to be waste would
was not properly before the court in Jackson.337 This, perhaps, explains
why so few decisions later cite or rely on Jackson; this also explains the
lack of the trail of subsequent citations that one would expect from a
watershed case.
Most importantly, there is significant evidence that the strict common law rule thrived long after these two cases. As of 1935, Alabama
courts affirmed the English rule, and described their holding as in conformity with the majority of jurisdictions: “many authorities, both English and American, declare that such changes will be deemed waste,
even though the value of the property would be enhanced by the alteration.”338 Similarly, as of 1836, Massachusetts followed the old
rule.339 The tenant had “no right to cut growing trees, that such cutting
would be waste, and that wild and uncultivated land cannot
be deemed estate yielding annual rents or profits.”340
Closer to the middle of the century, Alabama still retained the English rule, applying it to prevent a change in building uses. Alabama
recognized that

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 123 Side B

06/19/2017 09:53:44

4 FRALEY-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

908

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

6/12/17 1:56 PM

[100:861

C M
Y K

06/19/2017 09:53:44

341. Parkman’s Adm’r v. Aicardi & Tool, 34 Ala. 393, 396 (1859).
342. Miller v. Shields, 55 Ind. 71, 75 (1876).
343. See generally, e.g., Conner v. Shepherd, 15 Mass. 164, 167 (1818); Webb v. Townsend, 18 Mass. 21, 22 (1822); Ford v. Erskine, 50 Me. 227, 230 (1862).
344. Conner, 15 Mass. at 167.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
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[i]t is an old principle of the common law, that a tenant
is guilty of waste, if he materially changes the nature
and character of the building leased. Thus, it is held,
that he cannot convert a corn-mill into a fulling-mill, or
a water-mill into a wind-mill, or a log-wood-mill into a
cotton-mill, or a dwelling-house into a warehouse, or a
brewhouse into an office.341
Indiana applied the traditional English rule through 1876, limiting
the right of a tenant to take timber to only what was necessary for repairs.342
To see how long the old rule persisted beyond the American Revolution, it is important to look past the few published cases on waste to
the more robust litigation on dower rules. This line of cases demonstrates fidelity to the old rule, continuing well after the American Revolution and through the nineteenth century.343
Dower cases often incorporated the traditional waste rules to determine the rights of widows to wilderness lands. For example, in
1818 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided Conner v.
Shepherd, determining whether or not a widow was entitled to a dower
right within wild or uncultivated land owned by her husband.344 The
court concluded that she did not, relying primarily on the fact that
waste law, as it traditionally existed in the English common law,
would apply to the case.345 The court concluded that it was a needless
limit on the estate to give the widow a dower right in wild lands because she would be able to do nothing with the land and to draw no
income from it because of the application of waste laws.346 The court
reasoned that “her estate, would be forfeited if she were to cut down
any of the trees valuable as timber.”347 Similarly, “[i]t would seem too
that the mere change of the property from wilderness to arable or pasture land, by cutting down the wood and clearing up the land, might
be considered as waste.”348 The court specifically cited the traditional
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rule of not changing land uses, but did not apply it for the purpose of
maintaining boundaries.349 Instead, the court reasoned that the land
use rule existed to prevent changes in the property because “even if it
became thereby more valuable, [it] would subject the estate in dower
to forfeiture: the heir having a right to the inheritance, in the same
character as it was left by the ancestor.”350
In 1836 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court again considered
the issue and affirmed Conner v. Shepherd, although noting that for the
purposes of dower land it applied only to wild or uncultivated
lands.351 The court explained that there was no “dower in wild and
uncultivated lands” because such lands “yield no annual profit, and
secondly, because the widow could not make the only beneficial use of
them, of which they are capable, without committing waste and forfeiting the estate.”352 Following Horwitz, Sprankling, and Purdy, one
might expect that the rule would shift soon after the revolutionary period, but in fact it did not. Nearly a century later, Massachusetts followed the same rule.353
Massachusetts was not alone in relying on traditional English
waste law to determine the extent of dower rights. As the Maine Supreme Court explained in 1862, the old waste rule was retained by
statute, and thus “a widow shall not be endowed of wild lands of
which her husband died seized.”354 The court noted that “[t]his has
long been the settled law of this State and of Massachusetts.”355 In
maintaining this dower standard, Maine followed Massachusetts’ reasoning based on the English law of waste. According to the Maine Su-
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349. Id. at 164–67.
350. Id. at 167.
351. White v. Cutler, 34 Mass. 248, 250–51 (Mass. 1836). The court limited its ruling explaining that, “These reasons apply as well to the case of a woodlot situated in the midst of
a cultivated country, as to forest lands in their original state. But the chief justice, in delivering the opinion of the Court in this case, takes care in terms to limit its operation to the case
of woodlands not used or connected with a cultivated farm, or other improved estate.” Id.
352. Id. at 250; Webb v. Townsend, 18 Mass. 21, 22 (1822).
353. The question, then, when determining dower rights was whether or not the piece
of land was accurately described as wild and uncultivated. Goodspeed v. Lawrence, 208
Mass. 258, 260 (1911) (“The finding of the single justice that the widow can occupy the lands
here in question without committing waste does not mean, as the appellant contends, that
the widow can occupy but cannot improve these lots without committing waste. It is plain
that they can be improved without committing waste, and that the single justice so found. It
follows that they are not wild land within R.L. c. 132, § 3.”).
354. Ford v. Erskine, 50 Me. 227, 230 (1862).
355. Id.
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356. Id.
357. Johnson v. Perley, 2 N.H. 56, 59 (1819).
358. Dickinson v. Jones, 36 Ga. 97, 104 (1867).
359. Id. at 105.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 59 Wis. 557, 561, 18 N.W. 527, 529 (1884).
363. Id. at 560. Wisconsin adopts the modern American standard of considering the
overall value of the property and the rule of good husbandry: “[i]t is not waste for the life
tenant to cut down wood or timber, so as to fit the land for cultivation or pasture, provided
this does not damage or diminish the value of the inheritance, and is conformable to the
rules of good husbandry.” Id. at 561.
364. One might interpret Pennsylvania as a jurisdiction that in earlier years rejected
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preme Court, “[t]he reason for this rule is, that dower being an estate
for life only, woodland can be of no practicable value to the tenant in
dower, as it cannot be improved nor the wood cut off by her without
liability for waste.”356
New Hampshire courts similarly concluded, “[t]he right of dower
is limited to lands ‘in a state of cultivation;’ because a life estate in
lands in a state of nature would generally be worthless, the tenant for
life being subject to trespass and waste, if she cut down wood and
timber for the purposes of sale or cultivation.”357
As of 1867, the Supreme Court of Georgia still applied the traditional rule. Indeed, the court relied on Lord Coke, affirming that a
“tenant-for-life may cut timber trees, (that is, trees twenty years of
age,) at seasonable times, for the repairing of the houses or fences on
the land.”358 Additionally, the life tenant may use dead wood for
fuel.359 To go beyond these two uses, however, was waste, because
“[a]ll timber belongs to the remainder man.”360 The Georgia court noted that such restrictions had been removed in some of the American
states, such as New York, but found that within Georgia, “these common law doctrines have not been altered by any legislative enactment,
and
are
therefore
obligatory
on
the
[c]ourts.”361
In 1884, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the dower rules
from multiple states, reviewing those that did and did not apply the
English rule of waste to determine which lands were subject to dower
rights.362 Wisconsin, ultimately, did not prefer the English rule, but also did not dismiss it outright without considering the weight of the
states maintaining that rule.363 Multiple jurisdictions, long after the
American Revolution and into the twentieth century, relied on the
English rule of waste in establishing dower rights.364
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Cases interpreting wills and deeds provide another source of information on American courts applying the old rule, at least through
the first few decades after the Revolution. One of the traditional
quandaries of interpreting estate language is determining when the
author intended to create a life estate versus a fee simple. The general
rule has been to require words of inheritance to create a fee simple; the
overall rule of interpretation, however, has been the author’s intent to
benefit the devisee.365
Courts in multiple jurisdictions, relying on the incorporation of the
English rule of waste into their state common law, used waste law to
illuminate the intent. Courts reasoned that “a devise of wild and uncultivated land carried a fee without any words of inheritance;—
because a life estate would be of no use to the devisee.”366 Because of
the rules of waste, courts reasoned that a life estate in wild, uncultivated lands was “worthless.”367 Given that “[a] devise is always intended
for the benefit of the party,”368 the author must intend something more
than a life estate. The court concluded, “[t]he inference then is clear,
that a devise of such land, without words of inheritance, carries a
fee.”369 Like the dower cases, these will cases demonstrate the continuing importance of the traditional English rule.
When it comes to dating the shift from this rule, Merrill opposed
Horwitz, Sprankling, and Purdy, dating the rule change to nearer the
twentieth century, to the Melms case, which he describes as “the catalytic decision that began the process of remaking the doctrine in this
fashion.”370 Merrill argues that “[t]he real transformation in the American law of waste occurred not in the nineteenth century, but in the
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the British rule in dower cases. In Hastings v. Crunckleton, the court allowed the widow to
clear lands. However, it appears from the circumstances that the widow received only uncultivated lands in her common law division and therefore to have any support from the
lands, which she could not sell, she would have had to clear some area for cultivation. 3
Yeates 261 (1801). Such reasoning by the courts seems more an exception to the general rule
rather than the adoption of a new one.
365. In general, a devise “without words of inheritance” is one for life only. Sargent v.
Towne, 10 Mass. 303, 307 (1813). However, “[a] devise is always intended for the benefit of
the party.” Id.
366. Babb v. Perley, 1 Me. 6, 8–9 (1820).
367. Sargent, 10 Mass. at 307.
368. Id.
369. Id.
370. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1084.
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twentieth.”371 And Merrill has not been the only person to regard
Melms as the landmark case.372 Merrill argues “Before Melms, all courts
would have regarded the deliberate destruction of a house to be waste.
Indeed, any material alteration of property by someone temporarily in
possession was regarded as waste.”373
As we have seen, a number of American cases through the nineteenth century adopted the new rule, omitting the boundarymaintenance prong and leaving the waste rule with only the two value-maintenance prongs.374 So why does Merrill not see a shift until after Melms? Merrill argued that the cases cited by Horwitz, Purdy, and
Sprankling all involved agricultural cultivation.375 Merrill does not see
these cases as evidence of the new rule being applied because he maintains that courts would have reached the same outcome under the old
rule, and argues that it was “not clear that there was any real difference between English and American law on [agricultural cultivation
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371. Id. at 1080.
372. Thomas Merrill describes Melms as potentially “the most important decision ever
rendered by an American court concerning the law of waste.” Id. at 1055; see also Deepa
Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657, 672 (2014) (describing
Melms as the “landmark case” of when “American courts began to relax this absolute rule of
waste in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries”); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Absolute
Preferences and Relative Preferences in Property Law, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2157, 2183 n.157 (2012)
(describing Melms as “[a] leading American case that breaks with the English common law
rule”).
373. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1058. In its earliest iterations, the common law held that
the “[p]ulling down of a mansion-house” was not only waste, but actually an “aggravated
act[] of waste,” which might be restrained in equity despite a covenant providing the property “without impeachment of waste.” YOOL, supra note 23, at 15–16. The tenant was required to keep a house in good order even “though no timber grow on the ground.” COKE
ON LITTLETON § 53a (8th ed. 1822). However, other cases point to a different result by the
mid-nineteenth century. Writing in 1863, George Yool found that English courts would uphold the action of the defendant in removing a building provided that the value of the
property remained stable or increased. YOOL, supra note 23, at 60–61. Henry Roscoe, in his
treatise, finds that “[i]f the house be ruinous at the time of the tenant’s coming in, yet, if he
pull it down, it will be waste; unless he re-build it.” 1 HENRY ROSCOE, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF ACTIONS RELATING TO REAL PROPERTY 81–82 (1840). Roscoe goes on to say that
pulling down a house and rebuilding will be acceptable, provided that the new house is
neither smaller nor larger than the old one. Id. On the other hand, Roscoe does find that
converting a house to another purpose will be waste, even if the conversion increases the
property value. Id. at 82. See also Greene v. Cole 85 Eng. Rep. 1037 (KB) 1047 (discussing
how the building of a new house might or might not be waste, and requiring a new building to precisely match the size of the old one).
374. See supra Section IV.B.
375. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1079.
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and value change].”376 In support of this Merrill cites to Melms, which
briefly discussed two English cases, and reasoned that “‘even in England’ a change in agricultural uses by a tenant ‘will not be enjoined in
equity when it clearly appears that the change will be, in effect, a meliorating change which rather improves the inheritance than injures
it.’”377 In support of this proposition, Melms cited Doherty v. Allman
(1878)378 and In re McIntosh (1891)379 and Merrill provides no additional
support.380 As we have seen, however, the cases that Merrill cites are
not English cases following the old rule, but the new one.381 Merrill
neglected to recognize that the English courts had already shifted from
the original law of waste to embrace the new rule.
Notably, it does not seem that the court in Melms would have supported Merrill’s suggestion that the English courts still maintained the
old rule and that Doherty and In re McIntosh indicated that the old rule
would have allowed for value-enhancing shifts in land use. Although
Merrill does not discuss Bewes, Melms relies on Bewes when deciding
to adopt the new rule, specifically citing the pages where Bewes discusses how England had already adopted the new rule.382 Bewes, of
course, not only finds that the English adoption of the new rule dates
to the mid-nineteenth century, but also points to a case that addressed
not agricultural changes, but the tearing down of a barn and building
of another in a different location a significant distance away.383
The better understanding is that Melms contributed to the solidifying a trend that had already begun in the United States, with cases
such as Pynchon v. Stearns,384 and followed the new rule as it had al-
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376. Id. at 1079–80.
377. Id. at 1080 n.114.
378. [1878] 3 App. Cas. 709 (HL) (appeal taken from N. Ir.).
379. (1891) 61 LJR 164 (Eng.).
380. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1080 n.114.
381. See supra Section IV.A.
382. Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 104 Wis. 7, 12, 79 N.W. 738, 739 (1899).
383. BEWES, supra note 20, at 130. Jones v. Chappell, decided in 1875, also indicates that
the English courts had already considered and adopted the new rule in the context of buildings. In Jones, the court concluded that the old rule of “[i]f the tenant build a new house it is
w[aste]” was “not the law at the present time.” BEWES, supra note 20, at 138 (quoting Jones
v. Chappell [1875] 20 LR Eq. 539 (Eng.) 540).
384. Merrill describes Melms as “a milestone in a transformation in the law of waste
that took place in the twentieth century.” Merrill states that “[b]efore Melms, all courts
would have regarded the deliberate destruction of a house to be waste. Indeed, any material
alteration of property by someone temporarily in possession was regarded as waste.” Mer-
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rill, supra note 11, at 1058. See Pynchon v. Stearns, 52 Mass. 304 (1846).
385. Supra Part V.
386. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1080.
387. 237 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff’d mem. per curiam, 245 N.Y.S. 402 (App. Div.
1930), aff’d mem. per curiam, 177 N.E. 186 (N.Y. 1931).
388. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1082–83.
389. Id. at 1083.
390. Supra Part V.
391. Brokaw v. Fairchild, 237 N.Y.S. 6 (Sup. Ct. 1929), aff’d mem. per curiam, 245 N.Y.S.
402 (App. Div. 1930), aff’d mem. per curiam, 177 N.E. 186 (N.Y. 1931).
392. Merrill, supra note 11, at 1082–83.
393. Id.

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 126 Side B

ready been established in England.385 Merrill has argued against the
development narrative, finding “that transformation was not a manifestation of inexorable social and economic change. Rather, it was a
top-down reform introduced by the Legal Realist movement.”386 Merrill describes two conflicting decisions—Melms, a Wisconsin case that
adopted the new rule, and Brokaw v. Fairchild,387 a New York case that
rejected the new rule—as well as subsequent, successful lobbying in
favor of the Melms decision.388 Merrill concludes that the Melms rule
prevailed because “[t]he New York reform proved to be highly influential with bodies such as the American Law Institute, which also
adopted a test consistent with Melms for inclusion in the Restatement of
Property.”389
With that said, there remain reasons to be cautious of Merrill’s emphasis on Melms. In particular, treatise writers at the turn of the century appear to have found the changes in waste law fully under way rather than just nascent with Melms.390 Merrill’s distinguishing of earlier
cases fails to convince; contrary evidence suggests Melms was not a
landmark case. For that reason, it is hard to see Melms as the turning
point in American law. Merrill’s more persuasive argument involves
the influence of Melms on the American Law Institute. Merrill may indeed be correct that the backlash against a New York case, Brokaw,391
may have spurred American jurisdictions to more rapidly adopt the
new waste rule.392 Merrill suggests that the Melms decision became so
significant because the New York Law Review Commission, which
recommended that Brokaw be overturned, adopted the reasoning in
Melms, and the Review Commission, in turn, influenced the American
Law Institute.393
The timing of the shift matters for determining what factors influ-
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enced the change. A shift that did not occur at the time of the American Revolution, but roughly half a century later, casts doubt on the
idea that courts transformed waste due to pressures from land development. A shift in doctrine would have been enormously more useful
during earlier eras. In general, the earlier the shift the more useful it
would have been for citizens to take advantage of the rule in developing land. As it happens, the shift was quite late. Given how much
more useful the shift would have been earlier on, it is harder to see the
social and economic pressures of land development as the primary
force behind the changes in waste law.
VI. THE NEW HISTORY OF WASTE LAW AND A CRITIQUE OF MODERN
LEGAL HISTORY THEORY AND METHODS
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Supra Part IV.
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Supra Part III.
Supra Part IV.
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This new history of waste law differs from the traditional accounts
in two ways that matter deeply for those who study legal history.
First, the new history demonstrates that the change in waste law was
not a radical throwing out of old laws in response to economic pressures.394 Instead, the change maintained fidelity to existing legal doctrine.395 Second, while previous accounts source change in the social
and economic pressures of development or the persuasiveness of certain lobbyists and reformers, this Article demonstrates that law shifted
in response to modernizations in technology and did so logically and
to maintain coherence within the existing doctrines.396 The changes in
waste law do not support a story that casts law as entirely malleable.397
Instead, the changes show that property law shifted slowly, even if in
response to social contexts, and maintained fidelity to past doctrine.398
These differences matter not just because of the role waste law has
played in understanding American law more generally. Correcting
the story of waste law in America also provides an impetus to correct
the methodology of modern legal history. Accurately understanding
waste law requires knowledge of both the social contexts (here, science
and technology more directly than economic development) and the
doctrinal history. Without maintaining doctrinal investigation as a key
methodological component, law and society approaches risk anachro-
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nistic pulls such as the sense of the inevitability of development that
will, as they did in the case of waste law, distort our understanding of
the history.
A. A Critique of Modern Theories and Methods of Legal History
Prior to the movement to emphasize socio-economic contexts in legal history, scholars tended to focus on the slow evolution of doctrine.
In general, “[h]istorians did a good deal of ‘line-tracing’—connecting
the doctrines to be found in judicial decisions . . . —in a kind of ‘follow
the dots’ intellectual exercise.”399 Valid criticisms of this method soon
emerged. It “tend[ed] to rarify and isolate the law as a factor in historical change.”400 Moreover, isolating law implicitly suggested that law
was entirely immune to the complex forces of socio-economics, as well
as other social pressures and circumstances that fell short of revolution.
Hurst and Horwitz drove a reactionary force against this trend and
for decades now, historians instead have focused on the complexities
of law and social change, incorporating disciplines from psychology
and sociology to anthropology and economics. Horwitz, in particular,
influenced legal scholarship enormously,401 and did so particularly
with his Transformation of American Law, the book that included his
previously discussed reflections on waste law.402 Theoretically, Horwitz developed his approach more fully in Transformations II, which
explicitly tackled the subject of the relationship between law and poli-
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399. Harry N. Scheiber, Law and American Agricultural Development, 52 AGRIC. HIST.
439, 439 (1978).
400. Id.
401. Daniel Hamilton and Al Brophy have honored Horwitz with their edited book,
TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR MORTON
J. HORWITZ (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009).
On the other hand, Tomlins argues that Hurst, rather than Horwitz, provided the primary
metanarrative that “endures as a default setting” for legal history—the idea of the nation
the law built. See Christopher Tomlins, American Legal History in Retrospect and Prospect: Reflections on the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of Morton Horwitz’s Transformation of American Law, 28
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1135, 1141 (2003). Tomlins sees Horwitz as continuing the tradition of
Hurst rather than providing any new metanarrative. Id. at 1142.
402. Tomlins describes the book as having “a major influence on the field of American
legal history” and being “a focus for legal historical scholarship.” See Tomlins, supra note
401, at 1136. Laura Kalman finds that “routinely do legal historians today make The Transformation of American Law their starting point.” Laura Kalman, Transformations, 28 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 1149, 1149 (2003).

39285-mqt_100-3 Sheet No. 128 Side A

06/19/2017 09:53:44

4 FRALEY-FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

A NEW HISTORY OF WASTE LAW

6/12/17 1:56 PM

917

C M
Y K

06/19/2017 09:53:44

403. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 272 (1992).
404. Cass R. Sunstein, Where Politics Ends, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 3, 1992, at 38, 38.
405. See Tomlins, supra note 401, at 1136. Tomlins suggests that legal historians have
moved toward politics to fill the “vacuum left” after historians outside law abandoned politics for social and cultural history.
406. Id. at 1137.
407. Id. at 1140.
408. Sprankling, supra note 8, at 534–36.
409. Supra Parts II, III.
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tics.403 As Sunstein summarized it, the “overriding theme” of the book
was “the rise and fall of ‘Classical Legal Thought.’”404 Tomlins described “Horwitz’s key claim to innovation” within legal history as
proving “that the history of law was in crucial respects indistinguishable from past politics.”405 Horwitz, according to Tomlins, “discover[ed] that law was . . . thoroughly embedded in social conflict and
covered with the finger-prints of the powerful.”406 Law, for Horwitz,
was “what society’s ‘powerful groups’ used to confound and confine
the rest.”407 Following Horwitz, legal history has embraced a realist,
“law and society” approach, looking for explanations for legal change
in social forces.
Yet, focusing on the social context, particularly with a modern lens
and without a solid doctrinal investigation, leads to conclusions like
Sprankling’s on waste: “Driven by the instrumentalist vision, nineteenth-century American courts resoundingly jettisoned the waste doctrine’s ban on clearing forest land for cultivation.”408 As this Article
demonstrates, privileging the social context above tracing the evolution of legal doctrines ultimately distorts the role of law in early American society, suggesting that it was much more flexible and responsive
to socio-economic change than it necessarily was.409 The focus on law
as a construct effective for achieving social, economic, and spatial
goals can distort the nature of law as an independent, stable, and internally consistent structure of society—one that promotes social stability and affirms existing rights and investments, particularly where
property is concerned. Too much emphasis on social contexts, and
particularly on anachronistic future outcomes such as environmental
destruction, neglects the role of law as a conservative force in society—
making changes, particularly in property rights, more difficult to
achieve.
Few voices have spoken against the strength of the law and society
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movement in legal history. Yet, quiet rumblings periodically question
how much we have abandoned our native methodologies. Upon publication of Horwitz’s Transformations II, Cass Sunstein responded by
criticizing the book for focusing too much on scholarship of law and
too little on the actual “concrete developments in American law.”410
Part of the problem is that the law and society approach to legal history suggests where to look for sources of change, but in the end is far
more a vision of what law is than it is a demonstrable methodology.
The result is, a great deal of the time, that legal history lacks a methodology.
Legal historians are, admittedly, not really alone in suffering from
this malady. Historical method may be floundering as much outside
law as in it. David Henige recently argued, “[h]istorical method was
once a centerpiece of the historiographical enterprise, but this day
seems long gone.”411 As historians outside law seek to reestablish their
methods, legal historians should embrace a similar impulse.
B. A Prescription for Modern Legal Historians

Sunstein, supra note 404, at 40.
DAVID HENIGE, HISTORICAL EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENT 8 (2005).
Merrill, supra note 11, at 1092–93.
Id.
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What modern legal historians seem to have lost over the years is
their native methodology: the simple and sometimes tedious exercise
of tracing the evolution of doctrine. Beginning at the beginning and
ending at the end. It is only through tracing the evolution of doctrine
that historians capture the permanence of law—law’s consistency or
fidelity to itself.
Consider the importance of law’s fidelity to itself in the story of
waste law. This Article demonstrates that through the transformation
of the common law of waste to the modern rule both English and
American courts maintained substantial fidelity to existing law. That
fidelity is all the more significant if one accepts Merrill’s argument:
Merrill suggested that the new rule, as a default, is not so efficient or
useful when compared to a standard prohibiting all change and allowing the parties to contract around the rule.412 Merrill finds that a strict
rule prohibiting changes is one that is both a bargain-inducing default
rule, as well as a rule consistent with “broader understandings about
the value and function of property as an institution in our society.”413
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414. Sprankling, supra note 8, at 536.
415. Supra Part I.
416. Supra Part IV.
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If Merrill is correct, then courts in both countries adhered faithfully to
the value-maintenance standard, dropping the strict approach, even
when the strict approach was more efficient.
That’s strong evidence of the power of fidelity. Such evidence suggests that law maintains significant and structural or systemic preferences for consistency and fidelity that sometimes, or maybe even often,
trump other key values such as efficiency. This Article argues that legal historians should reintegrate the methodology of doctrine-tracing,
because without it, we have a poorer and less accurate theory of the
role of law in society and the process of transformations of law.
Methodologically, doctrine tracing provides a way to locate the evidence of law’s continuities and fidelities. There are, of course, many
examples of law’s fidelity, for better or worse. At times law maintains
doctrines based on incorrect information (such as antiquated principles of science), perhaps persisting long beyond what we might reasonably expect in light of the time necessary for procedural mechanisms to force their reconsideration in legislatures and courts.414 While
there is nothing to celebrate about our uncorrected errors, there is
something worth noticing in the pattern in terms of the strength of
law’s consistency over time. Moreover, historians need methods for
locating the evidence of continuities. The reigning methods of modern
legal history, with their focus on social pressures and transformation,
capture moments of change; they do not focus on the many pressures
that keep laws in place for centuries, even when the laws aren’t ideal.
Yet, historians, it is fair to say, have abandoned tracing the evolution of doctrine as an approach to legal history. Most historians focus
on social factors and economic circumstances that may influence law
without giving much attention to the power of law to resist social
change and maintain fidelity to past precedents.415 In the context of
property law, that power may be all the more important due to vested
rights and the risk of takings claims resulting from significant shifts in
doctrine. In the context of waste law transformation, Horwitz, Sprankling, and Purdy all emphasized the social circumstances and disregarded the continuities of law;416 the result was a skewed history of
how waste law changed in America. Doctrine tracing, as exemplified
in this Article, provides a way to ease back along the continuum from
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the law and society approach.
The point here is not that we have gone entirely astray in looking
to legal and societal approaches in legal history. This is not an argument against law as a social creation, but instead a push toward recognizing that law, at least within common law systems, maintains numerous mechanisms such as stare decises and vested rights that give
law a unique role in society, making it a force for perseverance and
stability. To account for legal change fully, legal history needs methodologies that gather precisely this kind of evidence: evidence of law’s
fidelity and resistance to change due to specific legal mechanisms. To
accurately understand transformations in law, historians cannot allow
investigations of social context to absolve them of the duty to conduct
a parallel investigation of the doctrinal history.
This argument does not aim to topple law and society approaches,
but rather to suggest that historians have gone too far along the spectrum, favoring social explanations for legal change and ignoring consistencies maintained through the evolution of doctrine. This Article
suggests not that we depart from the law and society approach entirely, but rather that historians reintegrate the distinctly legal history
methodology of tracing the evolution of doctrine. When the law and
society approach could have enriched our own distinct methodology,
it instead, unfortunately, largely replaced it.
VII. CONCLUSION
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Waste law has been transformational well beyond its bounds within legal scholarship. It has supported arguments for new approaches
to legal history and provided a concrete world in which to explore
complex issues of property theory. Following that trend, this Article
contributes to the overall literature on waste law, offering a number of
important correctives to existing accounts, but also employs the story
of waste law’s transformation to a greater purpose, offering a critique
of current methods in legal history.
This Article offers a new history of waste law—the first to engage
the development of the doctrine within the common law prior to the
adoption of the modern rule. This new history demonstrates the flaws
in the traditional account, which described a transformation that was
uniquely American and driven by the economics of land development.
This Article demonstrates that rather than creating a unique and distinctively American rule, our courts transformed waste law both contemporaneously with British courts and with a great deal of doctrinal
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consistency. In detailing this history, this Article illuminates the two
distinct functions of waste in the common law, recovering the previously undescribed boundary-maintenance function. By analyzing the
two distinct functions of waste law and delving into the history of the
boundary-making function in particular, this Article created a new and
more accurate account of the transformation of waste law.
Finally, this Article employs the new account of the waste law
transformation to critique the methodology of modern legal history.
The Article argues that legal histories have abandoned their traditional
methodology of tracing the evolution of doctrine in favor of law and
society approaches that seek social and economic explanations for legal change. When historians focus on social factors and economic circumstances that may influence law without giving much attention to
the power of law to resist social change and maintain fidelity to past
precedents, they not only create less accurate historical accounts, but
also skew perceptions of the role of law in society. The focus on law as
a construct effective for achieving social, economic and spatial goals
can distort the nature of law as an independent, stable, and internally
consistent structure of society—one that promotes social stability and
affirms existing rights and investments, particularly where property is
concerned. In light of these concerns, this Article argues for reintegrating the distinctly legal history methodology of tracing the evolution of
doctrine.
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